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 The Arab Spring has fundamentally altered the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA).  The regional revolution saw regime change in Tunisia, Egypt, and Yemen, and 
civil wars in Libya and, at the time of writing this, ongoing in Syria.  This thesis explores 
several dimensions of domestic and international politics related to the Arab Spring.  
Specifically, it evaluates the implications that the Arab Spring has had for selected Arab 
countries’ security relationships with the United States, how the Arab Spring has shed 
light on the doctrine of “Responsibility to Protect,” and the role of nonviolent civil 
resistance in outcomes in Libya.   
In examining the Arab Spring’s preliminary consequences, this thesis provides an 
initial understanding of how the revolutions affect the United States and challenge 
international norms.  Each chapter uses a different method to come to its conclusion.  To 
assess the effects of the Arab Spring on the U.S. security relationship with the MENA 
countries which did not experience regime change, two factors are applied: the country’s 
choice to adhere to public opinion and the influence of the shared threat with the United 
States.  The chapter finds that among other things, a perceived common threat will 
continue to ensure a strong security relationship with the United States.  The Arab 
Spring’s implications for “Responsibility to Protect” are determined by using the UN’s 
criteria for intervention and applying it in a comparison to the conflicts in Libya, where 
intervention was approved, and in Syria where the conflict continues.  It is determined 
that the Syrian conflict does not meet the criteria for intervention due to the overriding 
interests of UNSC members.  To evaluate the effectiveness of civil resistance, or 
nonviolent conflict, in Libya – where it was overshadowed by a violent civil war – 
effective strategies of civil resistance are applied to the movements present during the 
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conflict.  Civil resistance in Libya was effective and played a supporting role during the 
conflict to oust Qadhafi. 
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 The Arab Spring is a regional populist revolution that has changed political 
dynamics throughout the Middle East and North Africa (MENA).  It began in 2010 and 
still continues in one form or another, whether in continued violent conflict or continual 
regime change due to an uncertain citizenry.  The populations took to the streets, largely 
nonviolently, to call for an end to authoritarian rule and corruption.  While the initial 
uprisings began in December 2010 in Tunisia, in the coming months they spread to 
Egypt, Libya, and throughout the region. All countries in the region felt the effects of the 
Arab Spring.   
For the foreseeable future the MENA region will remain of strategic importance 
to the United States due to vital national security interests, namely the free flow of 
resources, defense against the threat of terrorism, and the concern for the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction.1  Most of the authoritarian regimes in the region were long-
time allies of the United States, and as such, were relied on to maintain stability in what 
was otherwise a volatile region.  The overthrow of these regimes has left security and 
power vacuums that threaten the stability of their neighbors.  The Arab Spring has altered 
the status quo in the region, creating implications for the relationships the United States 
has historically held within the MENA region.    
The Arab Spring is a fairly recent occurrence, and is largely unfinished.  Its 
effects on the international community may not be fully comprehended for years to come, 
but we can examine its immediate impacts on certain significant political dynamics.  
                                                          
1 Miles, Donna, “Centcom Chief: Middle East Decisions Will Have Wide Impact,” American Forces Press 
Service, U.S. Department of Defense (Oct 22, 2013) 
http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=120989 (accessed 9March2014). 
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Specifically, this thesis will examine 1) the initial effects the Arab Spring has had on 
historic U.S. security relationships, 2) implications for the relatively new notion in 
international governance of the “Responsibility to Protect,” and 3) the role of strategic 
nonviolence in the overthrow of a dictatorship through analysis of events in the countries 
affected by the uprisings. 
The first chapter examines the question of how the Arab Spring has affected 
security relationships between the United States and MENA countries that did not 
experience regime change, which were the monarchies.  The monarchies in question are 
the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries (Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, 
United Arab Emirates, and Qatar), Jordan, and Morocco.  These countries experienced 
some unrest during the Arab Spring, but not to the extent of other MENA countries, such 
as Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and Syria.  For decades the monarchies have enjoyed a 
mutually beneficial relationship with the United States.  The United States has provided 
security assistance in the form of training, funding, exercises, etc. and in return the 
countries in question have provided military basing, support in military operations, and 
assistance in containing transnational terrorism.   
Ultimately, the security relationship between the United States and the 
monarchies tend to change very little as long as the current regime stays in power.  The 
Arab Spring has created uncertainty, and the MENA kingdoms are unlikely to distance 
themselves from a willing security partner.  Additionally, the strategic importance of the 
MENA makes it important for the United States to maintain the status quo.  The chapter 
arrives at this conclusion by analyzing two factors that could alter a security relationship: 
public opinion and a common threat. 
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The Arab Spring changed the dynamic of public opinion in the MENA region.  
Prior to the unrest, the people’s voice mattered little; however, the revolution showed that 
the people could dictate the direction of the government and, in extreme cases, the 
government could be overthrown.  The monarchies recognized this possibility and have 
made concessions to the public in order to prevent further unrest.  The United States has 
been an ally to many of the authoritarian regimes in the region, and as the people call for 
national change, there is the potential that new or appeasing leadership could alter 
questionable alliances.   A threat common to two parties is essential for a security 
relationship.  In this case, the common threat is the expanding reach of Iran and 
transnational terrorism.    
The case studies test these theories using Jordan and Bahrain, countries that are 
both strategically important to the United States and experienced substantial unrest due to 
the uprisings.  This chapter examines the role of security cooperation in each country.  It 
also analyzes the concessions made by the regimes in order to appease the public and the 
status of the common threat between the United States and both countries. 
The second chapter examines the emerging international norm called 
“Responsibility to Protect,” its status after the multi-state intervention in Libya in 2011, 
and its absence in the ongoing Syrian civil war.  It poses the question: if “Responsibility 
to Protect” (R2P) was used to justify the intervention in Libya, why does the concept not 
compel intervention in Syria?  The answer to this question is determined by using Libya 
as the model for R2P and comparing and contrasting the two conflicts using the United 
Nation’s Three Pillars of R2P, and then employing the proposed six criteria for R2P as a 
“checklist” to determine whether intervention would be appropriate in the Syrian case.  
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The six criteria are: Just Cause, Right Intention, Last Resort, Legitimate Authority, 
Proportional Means, and Reasonable Prospect.  With these criteria in mind, the difference 
between the two conflicts, Libya and Syria, is that while Libya met the criteria for R2P, 
Syria lacks Legitimate Authority, Reasonable Prospect, and Right Intention making 
intervention inappropriate.  
The encompassing argument against R2P is that it is a breach of sovereignty in 
order to further the interests of the intervening party.  The members of the United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC) did not have any overriding national interests in Libya so they 
had no reason to object to intervention.  However in Syria, Russia, a member of the 
UNSC, does have interests which resulted in their objection to intervention.  The 
objection from the UNSC eliminates the criterion of Legitimate Authority.  Additionally, 
the criterion Reasonable Prospect is lacking.  The Syrian opposition is fractured, resulting 
in no government to replace the al-Asad regime if he were to be overthrown.  In contrast, 
the Libyan opposition was fairly unified and had an interim government in place to 
quickly take over governance.  The Syrian regime also enjoys external support from Iran 
and Russia, while the Libyan regime was isolated.  Intervention may cause more harm 
than good.  The North American Treaty Organization (NATO) stretched the Right 
Intention criterion in Libya by expanding the mission of establishing a no-fly-zone to 
enabling regime change.  This will make it difficult to convince the UNSC that regime 
change would not be the purpose of armed humanitarian intervention in Syria, making the 
Right Intention criterion questionable. 
This chapter ultimately demonstrates a failure of the concept of R2P and the 
selective nature of humanitarian intervention.  The purpose of R2P is to give the United 
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Nations a mechanism to prevent genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes 
against humanity.  It is intended to enable the international community to intervene in 
such instances, despite national interests and bias.  The failure of the UNSC to approve 
action in Syria is essentially a failure of R2P. 
The third chapter examines strategic nonviolence during the Arab Spring, 
specifically in Libya.  The uprising in Libya began in a similar vein as Tunisia and Egypt, 
with mass demonstrations that were largely nonviolent.  However, in the case of Libya 
the uprising quickly turned violent and resulted in a bloody civil war.  This chapter 
explores the question of the effectiveness of Libyan civil resistance in the overthrow of 
Qadhafi and subsequent transition to democracy.  
Using strategies and methods that were developed by activist scholars, 
particularly Gene Sharp, the chapter determines that the civil resistance groups active 
during the conflict were instrumental in the fall of the regime, particularly in attacking 
and defeating two elements of Qadhafi’s perceived sources of power, which were the 
control of the media and the loyalty of Tripoli.  Without these two foundations, Qadhafi 
would lose the narrative that he was in control of the country and was fighting a 
legitimate battle against terrorists and foreign invaders.  Civil resistance revolves around 
the idea that leadership, whether dictatorship or not, requires the obedience of the people 
in order to stay in power. Once that obedience is withdrawn the regime starts to lose 
legitimacy.   
Libyan civil resistance also has had a democratizing effect on the population, by 
allowing all walks of life to participate in resistance and to have a voice in governance.  
A purely violent conflict is generally selective in who can join, selecting those who have 
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some ability.  On the other hand, civil resistance allows and encourages mass 
participation, whether it is protesting, non-cooperation, or civil disobedience.  Civil 
resistance after the initial conflict was instrumental in holding the interim government 
accountable for its actions, disbanding some militias, and educating the population on 


















CHAPTER 1: Security Cooperation Post Arab Spring: Maintaining the Status-Quo 
in the Kingdoms 
Following World War II, the United States developed strategic relationships with 
countries in the Middle East to contain communism and secure the flow of oil.  Over 
time, the purpose for these relationships evolved from containing communism to 
containing Islamic extremism and the looming threat of Iran in order to maintain the 
stability of the region.  It is in the United States’ best interest to preserve the status quo in 
the region, and, oftentimes, that requires a relationship with a long lasting dictatorship or 
hereditary monarchy.       
The phenomenon of the Arab Spring affected all countries in the Middle East and 
North Africa (MENA).  Long established authoritarian regimes were forced to meet the 
demands of their people.   There was forced regime change in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, 
Yemen, as well as an ongoing conflict in Syria with regime change as the declared end-
state of the opposition.2  The other countries of the region, primarily the Arab 
monarchies, have temporarily placated their populations with economic and political 
reform.  In a region where public opinion hasn’t been the priority of the governments, it 
now matters.  This brings into question the status of U.S. influence and standing in the 
region, particularly in terms of security cooperation.  The United States has never been 
popular in the Middle East, but now old alliances are a liability and a cause of suspicion 
for the populations who have just discovered the power of public will.   
                                                          
2 Oweis, Khaled Yacoub, “Syrian Opposition to Shun Peace Talks Unless Assad Exit is Goal,” Reuters, Oct 
22, 2013, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/10/22/uk-syria-crisis-geneva-idUKBRE99L0LE20131022 
(accessed 22 March 2014). 
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This chapter will analyze the effects of the Arab Spring on the security 
relationships between the United States and the countries that have made concessions to 
appease their restless populations, leaving their regimes intact; specifically, Jordan, 
Morocco, and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, which include Bahrain, 
Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.3  An important 
similarity of these countries is that they are all monarchies and most are major producers 
of oil.  The governments of the GCC, Jordan, and Morocco met selected demands of their 
populations to stop the uprisings before they got out of hand.  This might be perceived as 
weakness domestically and externally, as people recognize they have the ability to force 
their opinion to be heard, which, as seen in neighboring countries, they will likely do so 
until their demands are met.   
The rise of popular power could lead to change in foreign policy as well as 
domestic principles, as governments compromise traditional national relationships to 
meet their populace’s demands.  It is possible that countries in the region will distance 
themselves from the United States in order to improve their standing with the newly 
formed governments in the region and with their own citizenry.  Less likely, but also 
possible, governments in MENA could move closer to the U.S. out of fear and 
uncertainty of what the transitioning regional governments represent.  There is also 
bound to be a sense of suspicion and anxiety in regards to U.S. policy now that the 
United States has abandoned its alliances with countries like Egypt. 
                                                          
3 Israel, while also a regional actor and a recipient of U.S. security cooperation, will not be included in this 
assessment.  The scope of this chapter is about countries which may yet sill succumb to a revolutionary 
moment and have experienced unrest due to the Arab Spring.  Israel has remained relatively stable and is 
unlikely to fall due to a popular uprising.   
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In order to determine the impact of the Arab Spring on security cooperation in the 
region, I must first ensure a common understanding of security cooperation and then 
examine its purpose and importance to the United States in the Middle East.  Next, I will 
identify the changes that have occurred because of the Arab Spring uprisings and how 
they may impact the security partnerships, specifically with traditional allies.  I have 
identified two factors that have the potential of changing a strategic relationship.  The 
first pertains to the question of public opinion at a domestic level; are the demands of the 
people being heard by their governments and are the governments feeling pressure to 
meet those demands?  The second factor consists of the common threats, real or 
perceived, that are shared between the United States and the country in question.  Has the 
Arab Spring changed these threats?  For the purposes of my analysis, these two factors 
will be applied to two strategically important countries: Bahrain and Jordan.   
It should be noted, that while recognizing that other factors may have an influence 
on existing security relationships, the focus of this chapter is the effects and potential 
effects of the Arab Spring on the existing security cooperation between the impacted 
countries and the United States.  The U.S. drawdown and the pivot, the change in 
national priorities, may change relationships, but it is not the intent of this chapter to 
discuss this as the reason for change.  I also believe that the Middle East will remain 
strategically important as long as the United States is reliant on its oil, transnational 
terrorism is a threat, and Iran remains a threat. 
Security Cooperation 
Security cooperation should not be confused with cooperative security.  
Cooperative security is a term that defines “an obligation of member states to 
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defend…states within a group of treaty signatories,”4 such as the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO).  NATO also serves as a good example of a security community, a 
concept which is also not being examined in this chapter.  Security communities, as 
defined by Karl Deutsch, are a grouping of states that regardless the conflict will not go 
to war with each other.  Security cooperation on the other hand, is a blanket term that 
encompasses all U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and State Department interaction 
with a foreign government’s defense sector.  Security assistance, a more common term, 
falls under this category.  For the purpose of this chapter, the terms security cooperation 
and security assistance will be used interchangeably.   
Security cooperation is one of the primary functions of U.S. foreign policy, 
conducted to meet national security objectives simultaneously.  It is a function of the 
DoD in coordination with the Department of State.5  Security cooperation is defined in 
multiple military manuals that are derived from the National Security Strategy.6  
Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 5132.03 assigns responsibility across the DoD 
for the execution and planning of security cooperation among the military geographic 
combatant commands.  DoDD 5132.03 and Joint Publication 3.0 provide the widely 
accepted definition of security cooperation as:    
Activities undertaken by the DoD to encourage and enable 
international partners to work with the U.S. to achieve strategic 
objectives.  It includes all DoD interactions with foreign defense 
                                                          
4 Cohen, Richard, Mihalka, Michael, “Cooperative Security: New Horizons for International Order,” The 
George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, The Marshall Center Papers, No. 3,  
http://www.marshallcenter.org/mcpublicweb/MCDocs/files/College/F_Publications/mcPapers/mc-paper_3-
en.pdf (accessed 25 Nov 2012). 
5 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “DSCA Overview,” http://www.dsca.mil/about_us.htm (accessed 
21 Oct 2012). 
6 National Security Strategy of the United States, May 2010, 




and security establishments, including all DoD-administered 
security assistance programs, that: build defense and security 
relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, 
including all international armaments cooperation activities and 
security assistance activities; develop allied and friendly military 
capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations; and 
provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to host 
nations.7  
 There are multiple programs within security cooperation that the U.S. offers or a 
country can request.  They involve training, weapons sales, combined operations, 
funding, and anti-terrorism assistance and include: Foreign Military Sales (FMS), Foreign 
Military Financing (FMF), and International Military Education and Training (IMET).  
Bi-lateral agreements and base leases are also parts of security cooperation.        
The former U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) commander, General James 
Mattis, articulates the most contemporary and comprehensive look at security 
cooperation in the Middle East in his 2012 statement on the posture of USCENTCOM, 
presented to the House Armed Service Committee.  General Mattis cites the strategic 
importance of the region primarily due to its large reserves of oil, thus making regional 
stability important to all parties.   He offers three major threats to stability: al-Qaeda and 
its affiliates,8 the Arab-Israeli conflict, and Iran.  USCENTCOM’s strategic approach to 
the region can be summed up with a single statement: “we will advance our strategic 
objectives through a tailored approach by seeking a nexus of common interests and 
                                                          
7 Department of Defense Directive 5132.03, Oct 2008, 
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/513203p.pdf (accessed 21 Oct 2012). 
8 Affiliates in this sense would include al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, al-Qaeda in the Islamic 
Maghreb, and various other groups that claim affiliation with al-Qaeda 
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identifying common ground with partners that puts [the U.S.] on a trajectory for shared, 
long-term benefit.”9  
Stability in the Middle East has been the priority of the United States after 9/11 
and the purpose of the subsequent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.  General Mattis states 
that the strategic importance of the Middle East lies in its vast oil reserves, and this is the 
primary reason that stability of the region is in the interest of the U.S.  A secondary 
interest is to contain Islamic extremism.  One of the historic components of stability in 
the region has been the existence of authoritarian regimes.     
Derek S. Reveron explains the importance of cooperation in the Middle East in 
his article “Old Allies, New Friends: Intelligence Sharing in the War on Terror.”  He 
emphasizes the importance of developing security relationships to combat trans-national 
terrorism.  Of most importance is developing relationships with governments in the 
Middle East, where most terrorists originate.  Reveron notes that it takes a common threat 
– the second factor which influences a strategic relationship - to develop those 
partnerships; in the case of the Middle East the most obvious and immediate threat is 
trans-national terrorism.  Enabling another country to defend itself is beneficial for both 
countries.  On one hand, the United States doesn’t need to commit large forces to the 
area, and on the other hand, the recipient nation maintains its sovereignty while 
developing its military capability. 
 A different perspective on the potential of security assistance in the Middle East is 
offered by Kenneth McKenzie and Elizabeth Packard’s recent article “Enduring Interests 
                                                          
9 Mattis, James N. General, “Statement of General James N. Mattis, U.S. Marine Corps Commander U.S. 
Central Command Before the House Armed Service Committee on the Posture of U.S. Central Command, 
Mar 2012, p 11 http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2012/03%20March/Mattis%2003-06-
12.pdf (accessed 25 Nov 2012). 
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and Partnerships: Military-to-Military Relationships in the Arab Spring.”  In this 
commentary they explain the importance of security assistance and the military 
engagements especially during and after the Arab Spring.   They essentially argue that the 
relationships that were built through security cooperation programs before the Arab 
Spring have and will be the enduring factor in helping the U.S. “respond effectively 
to…reform movements while continuing to ensure regional security and stability.”10     
Security assistance gives the U.S. the opportunity to develop credibility and 
influence in the region.  The U.S. can develop friendly regional powers through the 
selective amount of security assistance it provides.  Successful partnerships provide the 
United States a foothold in the Middle East.  For instance, the U.S. military maintains key 
bases in Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Oman to exercise influence 
in the region.  Additionally, weapons and equipment are prepositioned in some of these 
countries to secure future U.S. interests.11  If these countries were to change their security 
relationship with the United States, U.S. strategic goals would necessarily need to be re-
worked.  One of the key questions that must be answered is: what are the factors that 
would alter a security partnership?   
Changing a Security Partnership 
As previously identified, public opinion within the country receiving security 
cooperation and a common threat with the United States are two of the major factors that 
would likely change a security partnership.  In the following sections I will describe these 
                                                          
10 McKenzie, Kenneth, Packard, Elizabeth, “Enduring Interests and Partnerships: Military-to-Military 
Relationships in the Arab Spring,” Prism 3, No. 1, p 99 
11 Reveron, Derek S., “Weak States and Security Assistance,” Prism1, No. 3, Georgetown University Press 
(2010), p 30, http://www.ndu.edu/press/weak-states.html (accessed 20 Oct 2012).  
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two factors and evaluate how the regional unrest could potentially impact security 
cooperation.      
Public Opinion: The U.S. has supported authoritarian regimes in the MENA region in 
order to safe-guard the status quo.  Mahmood Monshipouri and Ali Assareh explain in 
their article “The New Middle East and the United States: What to Expect After the 
Uprisings?” that the policy of the United States has been to protect the flow of oil, 
support Israel and pro-Western authoritarian regimes, and deter and contain the Islamic 
threat.  This has been accomplished by supporting the regimes with security assistance 
and economic aid.  In making the decision to back the authoritarian regimes, the U.S. has 
often turned a blind eye to human rights violations.  The U.S. has supported the regimes 
out of fear that supporting the people and, in extent, democracy (freedom for the people 
to choose their own governments), would allow anti-American Islamist regimes to come 
to power.12  Now that the Arab Spring uprisings have taken place, the United States has 
made another choice, and to focus its political support behind the popular uprisings in 
countries, like Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia, while supporting the governments of the GCC, 
Jordan and Morocco.    
In his article “U.S. Security Assistance in the Middle East: Helping Friends or 
Creating Enemies?” former Ambassador Dennis Jett argues that militarily supporting a 
repressive regime may be counterproductive.  Supporting a repressive regime to fight 
terrorism may have the short term effect of isolating the terrorists in that country, but will 
likely alienate the population and ultimately create more enemies of the United States.  
Jett proposes that building the capacity of the government, encouraging democracy, and 
                                                          
12 Monshipouri, Mahmood, Assareh, Ali, “The New Middle East and the United States: What to Expect 
After the Uprisings?” Insight Turkey Vol 13 No. 3 (2011) p 122. 
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human rights would have long-term results, whereas introducing enhanced military 
capabilities, although useful and necessary, would only be a short-term solution.13   
At the time Jett was writing his article, the unrest of the Arab Spring was ongoing 
in Egypt.  Egypt, under a repressive government, enjoyed much security assistance from 
the United States.  Jett compares Egypt to Iran under the Shah and warns, “close 
relationships with dictators can provide short-term stability but prove to be long-term 
disasters.”14  In other words, the United States propping up regimes across the region to 
maintain the status quo has failed to address the way those governments were governing.  
Now, if the people were able to achieve a “democratic solution” they may see the United 
States as part of the problem.   After the Arab Spring and the “democracy” that it brought 
with it, the alienation of the population that resulted from U.S. assistance to authoritarian 
regimes may negatively affect the relationship that country is willing to have with the 
United States.   
Public opinion has the potential of impacting a nation’s foreign policy or affecting 
its choice of allies.  Daniel Byman discusses this powerful role of public opinion in 
shaping a nation’s foreign policy in his article “Regime Changes in the Middle East: 
Problems and Prospects.”  Public opinion is a force to be reckoned with and Islamists 
have the potential of taking a more prominent role on the political scene.  He states that 
before the Arab Spring public opinion mattered little.  Byman uses the example of Jordan 
and Egypt’s peace agreement with Israel, made against the general will of the people.  In 
comparison, today, even in the countries that witnessed limited unrest, like the GCC 
                                                          
13 Jett, Dennis, “U.S. Security Assistance in the Middle East: Helping Friends or Creating Enemies?” 




countries and Jordan, governments are listening to public opinion, as can be seen in the 
concessions that they made to bring calm.   
Another major transformation is that new regimes are instituting Islamic Law in 
their constitutions and Islamic political groups are gaining more clout.  It is likely that 
they will look critically at the former regime’s ties to the West.  This differs with 
countries in the GCC, Jordan, and Morocco, where political parties are outlawed or have 
only notional opportunities and the monarchies already have religious credibility.  Byman 
states that even “regimes that withstood the Arab Spring, the lack of elections…damage 
their claim to rule with the support of their people.”15  Popular support will also dictate 
whom the government can or will support.  For example, if popular sympathy is for the 
opposition of Yemen then the government will find it difficult to support the repression 
even if they were longtime supporters of the regime.16 
These new governments or newly appointed leaders will not necessarily be 
friendly to the West.  They may seek to distance themselves from the United States to 
maintain their fragile popular support.  The growing power of popular opinion means 
future partnerships will not be as they were.  New political players, specifically the 
Islamists, see the U.S. as complacent and supportive of the former repressive regimes.17  
Accepting U.S. support could be seen as suspicious to constituents.18  The 
governments/monarchies of the GCC, Jordan, and Morocco have remained the same, 
                                                          
15 Byman, Daniel, “Regime Change in the Middle East: Problems and Prospects,” Political Science 
Quarterly Vol.127 No 1 (2012) p 32. 
16 Ibid p 34 
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however the pressure of the people for change may cause them to alter their policies in 
order to appear authentically Islamic and thus maintain their legitimacy.   
Public opinion is hugely influential in a country adjusting an existing partnership 
with the U.S.  This wasn’t a factor before the Arab Spring due to the authoritarian nature 
of the governments.  Now, post-revolution, the governments of the Middle East, whether 
changed or not, have more respect for the opinions of the people.  “Arab 
Spring…American Fall?” Emma Sky’s article for the Harvard International Review, 
discusses U.S. policy in the Middle East.  She explains that the United States has 
supported the regimes that abused their people by building the capacity of their militaries, 
the primary tool of oppression.  The people recognize this and are suspicious of U.S. 
intentions in the region post-Arab Spring.   
Sky explains that the Arab Spring will likely “result in Arab public opinion 
mattering more.”19  The new leaders and monarchies will have to be more sensitive to the 
will of their people.  She suggests that public opinion will influence the will of the 
government in relations to U.S. policy.  In contrast, in the article “Swords into 
Ploughshares: The Effect of Pacifist Public Opinion on Foreign Policy in Western 
Democracies,” William Davis makes the argument that in democratic governments a 
leader is more inclined to ignore public opinion if the state is threatened, and vice versa, 
during times of reduced threat.20  The Middle East isn’t the variable that Davis was 
working with as he wrote, but his argument may be applied to transitioning governments 
that use the West as a model.     
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Like Davis, in their study, “Security Status: Explaining Regional Security 
Cooperation and its Limits in the Middle East,” Bruce W. Jentleson and Dalia Dassa 
Kaye argue that domestic politics do influence foreign policy, especially in the case of 
those regime’s facing serious threats to their survival.  They describe the “search for 
authenticity” in the guise of secular leaders in constant conflict with Islamist political 
coalitions. 21  Also, ethnic or religiously led governments are more likely to “pursue 
confrontational policies towards their regional neighbors because cooperation would 
undermine their legitimacy and threaten their domestic support.”22  
The Gulf Cooperation Council countries, Jordan, and Morocco, are pro-Western 
monarchies with a unique position in the region.  They have largely remained intact after 
the Arab Spring.  Their populations are now looking outward to countries like Egypt and 
Libya who have revamped their governments; their populace may be encouraged to 
follow suit.  The “search for authenticity” as previously mentioned, may come into play, 
especially after regional powers have taken on a more Islamic focused government.  
Similar governments will dampen their pro-Western leanings in order to remain 
legitimate in the Arab world. 
Taking these factors into account, it is likely that the Gulf Cooperation Council 
monarchies, Jordan and Morocco, although affected by the Arab Spring, will establish 
closer ties to the United States in the realm of security to protect against external threats, 
while publicly criticizing U.S. policy in the region to appease their populations.  These 
countries support each other and while the regimes/Kings remain in power, foreign policy 
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will most likely not change.  Security cooperation with the U.S. is a valuable asset to 
regional governments, and the Arab Spring has created too much uncertainty for them to 
distance themselves from a willing security partner that has vital interests in the region.  
To date, the monarchies were mostly successful in buying off their population with 
limited economic and political reform.   
Common Threat: The National Security Strategy and the DoD’s Quadrennial Defense 
Report both explain the importance of security cooperation and partnership building in 
order to meet the security demands of the 21st Century.  Both documents warn that the 
United States cannot fight global terrorism or create a stable Middle East alone.  The 
military capacity of regional countries must be enhanced for them to act without a 
sustained U.S. presence.  The National Security Strategy states that security cooperation 
has the ability to prevent future conflicts by modernizing a nation’s capabilities and 
capacity to meet a common threat.23    
A common threat is essential for a country to accept U.S. security assistance, or 
for that matter the United States offering assistance.  As mentioned previously, the 
United States’ view three major threats to regional stability: trans-national terrorism, Iran, 
and the Arab-Israeli conflict.24  For the GCC countries, Morocco, and Jordan, two of the 
threats shared with the United States are Iran and trans-national terrorism, specifically al-
Qaeda and its affiliates, which are regional al-Qaeda franchises, such as al-Qaeda in the 
Arabian Peninsula.  Iran poses a looming threat to the Sunni elite in the Gulf Cooperation 
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Council countries, Jordan and Morocco, as they perceive it as having a malicious 
influence on their Shia populations.  As can be seen during the Arab Spring, when the 
Shia population was protesting in Bahrain, the regime was quick to blame it on Iranian 
interference.25    
The “democratization” of the Arab Spring was not good for al-Qaeda interests.26  
An unintentional effect of the Arab Spring uprisings may have caused al-Qaeda to turn its 
attention to the repressive Arab monarchies.  One of its many targets is pro-Western 
governments that repress their people, but during the Arab Spring, the people were able 
to have their way, forcing their governments to change, taking away al-Qaeda leverage.  
However, the GCC countries, Jordan and Morocco, are still pro-Western, their regimes 
still intact, and they’re still controlling their people.  Al-Qaeda remains a threat to these 
countries, and this threat will cause them to maintain their security relationship with the 
United States, which is seen as the best guarantor of security.   
Andrew J. Shapiro states that today more countries believe it is in their national 
interest to form a security relationship with the U.S. than in years past.27  Their desire 
emerges from a perception that they are unable to mitigate external and internal threats 
without the support and guidance of the United States.  Shapiro explains the transition of 
threat from the fear of the power of neighboring countries to those same countries 
potential weakness.28  The Arab Spring exacerbates this fear with the uncertainty brought 
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about by the transitioning governments.   Essentially, a weak government with a weak 
military is potentially helpless to stop a terrorist organization from using its territory as a 
safe haven.       
 McKenzie and Packard also touch on the importance of a real or perceived 
common threat.  They do this by giving the example of joint exercises and training 
missions, describing how they are strictly focused on areas of “mutual concern.”29  They 
continue by stating that common cause is the “hallmark of mil-to-mil engagements” and 
this is what creates long lasting relationships between militaries, and in, extent nations.30  
Additional Factors:  There is another aspect of the countries in question that have 
enabled them to retain the status quo despite the uprisings.  Most of it has to do with how 
they used the security cooperation they received from the United States.   Eva Bellin 
published two articles in the journal, Comparative Politics that explain the intricacies of 
the governments of the MENA region.  She conducted two studies; the first one in 2004, 
“The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in the 
Comparative Perspective,” and then she revised it in 2012 after the Arab Spring in 
“Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Lessons from the 
Arab Spring.”  In both studies she discusses the reasons why the region as a whole failed 
to initiate the transition from authoritarianism to democracy (as eventually occurred in 
some nations during the Arab Spring) while other regions of the world had.   
The prerequisites that she identified for democracy were present; however, she 
argued that a robust “coercive apparatus” that is willing and able to stamp out opposition 
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enables the regime to remain in power and to be repressive.31  This coercive apparatus in 
most cases is the nation’s military and security services.  What is a willing and able 
coercive apparatus?  Bellin tells us that there are four factors that explain the power of 
these agencies and organizations in the Middle East and North African region: financial 
health of the apparatus, international support, level of institutionalization, and the degree 
of popular mobilization against it. 
 These factors can apply directly to the countries analyzed in this chapter, 
specifically when looking at why certain regimes did not topple.  In most cases, as Bellin 
discusses, financial health of the security services are covered by “rentier income.”32 
Most countries in the GCC receive rent for oil resources, basing rights (from the United 
States), and foreign aid.  International support, in the form of security cooperation from 
the United States, has boosted the coercive apparatus of these countries in order to protect 
strategic interests (flow of oil, containing Islamic extremism, and Iran).   
In further discussion of the “rentier” countries, such as the GCC countries, Daniel 
Byman explains that oil economies may inhibit democratization as the “top-down” rent 
from oil reserves strengthen the governments and they don’t need to tax citizens for 
revenue.33  Revenue without taxation gives the government the say on how they want to 
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spend the money received from rent.  This enables the government to develop a robust 
security apparatus of their own design.  
The GCC countries have a patrimonial security structure, meaning the head of the 
security forces is more than likely a relative or a tribal member of the head of the country.  
This makes them heavily vested in the continuity of the regime.  In other words, they will 
be more inclined to use violence to stop an uprising and prevent regime collapse.  
Bahrain for example has a Sunni led security apparatus, while the recent protesters have 
been largely Shia.  This creates an “us versus them” mentality at the national level.    
Bellin’s final factor, the degree of popular mobilization against the regime can 
also be applied to the Gulf countries and Jordan.  The protests there, in comparison to 
Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen, etc., were relatively small, with the exception of Bahrain.  
Bellin’s argument is simply that security forces will have an easier time using violence to 
quell a smaller revolt than a larger one.   
Case Study 
 The countries chosen for the case studies are the Kingdom of Bahrain and the 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.  Both, as the names suggest, are monarchies; additionally, 
Bahrain is a member of the GCC while Jordan enjoys its support.  The two countries 
endured protests during Arab Spring; both have attempted reform, and as of April 2014, 
the governments are still in place.  Bahrain and Jordan are still suffering from ongoing 
protests resulting from the uprising.   Both are strategically important to the United States 
and enjoy considerable security assistance.  The literature suggests the Arab Spring will 
not affect security cooperation in these countries as long as the regimes stay in power.  
Security cooperation with the United States will not likely change as long as the regimes 
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make the necessary public concessions to stay intact.  The threat has not changed and 
may have even increased, causing the countries to move closer to the United States.   
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan 
 Jordan is a monarchy with a constitution, but it is not quite a constitutional 
monarchy.  The King is the head of the state, but there is also a parliament with a Prime 
Minister.  In Jordan’s case, King Abdallah II, who has ruled since 1999, has the power to 
approve and dismiss the Prime Minister and the parliament.  Jordan’s economy is for the 
most part reliant on foreign aid.34   
Security Relationship with the United States 
 Primarily due to its geographic location, maintaining Jordan as a capable ally is 
vital for the United States.  Jordan is bordered by Israel, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq.  It 
acts as a buffer between the other Arab countries and Israel, prevents spillover from 
Syrian conflict, and maintains a large Palestinian refugee population.  USCENTCOM 
Commander General Mattis explained Jordan’s importance in his Commander’s Posture 
Statement:    
Jordan remains one of our staunchest regional allies, ready 
to stand by us when we need them and one that has 
deployed side by side with U.S. forces. Jordan has shared 
interests with the U.S. – and other responsible Middle East 
nations – in regional stability and reform. We remain 
grateful for King Abdullah’s leadership in hosting direct 
discussions between Israeli and Palestinian negotiators. The 
Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF) leadership is committed to 
its partnership with the U.S. and understands that in order 
to stay relevant, they must adapt their forces.35  
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 Military assistance to Jordan is in the form of FMF and IMET.  Jordan used FMF 
to upgrade and modernize its air force and counter-terror capability.  The kingdom has 
purchased upgrades to its F-16 fighters, air-to-air missiles, radar systems, and Blackhawk 
helicopters.36  In October 2012, the United States agreed to upgrade the Royal Jordanian 
Air Force’s national air command, control, and communications infrastructure.37  Jordan 
receives U.S. anti-terrorism assistance from the Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, 
Demining, and related Programs and also has several PATRIOT Anti-Missile Batteries 
that it received in 2003 prior to the U.S. invasion of Iraq.38    
 In partnership with the United States, Jordan hosts several combined exercises on 
its territory, two of which are “Early Victor” and “Eager Lion.”  “Early Victor” is 
conducted annually and most recently Jordan hosted “Eager Lion” which was conducted 
in June 2013, with over 19 countries participating.39  The goal of the exercise was to 
increase military engagement and interoperability.  The United States also helped to 
finance the construction of the King Abdallah II Special Operations Training Center, an 
international training facility in Amman.40  Interoperability and modernization that was 
advanced by security cooperation enabled the Jordanian Air Force to participate in 
Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR in Libya.   
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Jordan’s Arab Spring Experience 
 Like other countries in the region, the Arab Spring uprisings in Jordan began in 
January 2011.  The protests were largely nonviolent and called for economic and political 
reform.  Similar to protests in the GCC countries, the protests called for reform and the 
removal of “corrupt” ministers, but not the ouster of the King, at least not initially.41  
After making token reforms the protests subsided; however, protests reignited in October 
2012 after a decision to cut fuel subsidies.  In some of the new protests the people called 
for the ouster of the regime.42    
Public Opinion: King Abdallah acted quickly to quell the protests in early 2011: he 
increased salaries of state employees, dismissed the current prime minister, and appointed 
a committee to study reform.  These initial reforms were not enough and the people 
continued to protest.  King Abdallah made a televised speech and promised additional 
reforms: announced a parliamentary form of government where the prime minister would 
be elected by the people, limited the king’s power to dismiss parliament, announced 
amendments to the constitution, and again dismissed the prime minister.43     
Additionally, the government was able to play divisions in society off of each 
other; to slow the unrest.  Jordan is split into two groups, West Bank Jordanians and East 
Bank Jordanians which are composed of Palestinians and original Jordanian tribes 
respectively.44  The monarchy’s support base has traditionally been with the East Bank 
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Jordanians.  This group enjoys representation in parliament, government jobs, and 
military positions.  The Palestinians have limited representation, and make up at least half 
of the population.   
The recent November 2012 protests over cuts in fuel subsidies saw the first time 
the public called for the abdication of the King.45  Additionally, the East Bank Bedouin 
tribes that make up the security apparatus that protects the monarchy have also begun to 
protest, a worrisome sign for the regime.  Labeling the protests as Palestinian unrest, 
creates a sense of illegitimacy, and keeps the public from realizing the kingdom’s base is 
cracking.46 
 Many protesters were arrested and are facing lengthy imprisonment for calling for 
the downfall of King Abdallah.  Freedom House has rated Jordan as “Not Free,” citing 
the government’s closure of internet sites and other forms of media that were critical of 
the regime.47  The United States has so far given support to the King and applauded his 
continuous efforts for reform.  As long as the King remains in power, continued security 
cooperation with the United States will not be in danger.  
Common Threat: Terrorism continues to be a threat shared between the United States 
and Jordan; thus, maintaining Jordan’s capabilities is in the best interest of both 
countries.  The stability of Jordan is vital to the stability of the region, particularly with 
the current unrest in Syria and the threat of spillover violence.  For example, in October 
2012, Jordan security forces foiled a terrorist plot targeting the U.S. Embassy among 
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other locations in Jordan.  The terrorists had reportedly crossed the border from Syria and 
were planning on using weapons they had acquired there.48   
Jordan has demonstrated their willingness to continue cooperating with the United 
States during and post Arab Spring.  Cooperation can be seen in the multi-national Eager 
Lion exercise and their recent contributions to Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR in 
Libya.  Terrorism remains a threat to Jordan due to their steadfast pro-Western policy in 
the region.   
 However, Jordan may be vulnerable to the actions and opinions of its neighbors, 
especially since it is reliant on foreign aid in order to function.  There were rumors that 
Qatar had offered Jordan economic aid in exchange for allowing HAMAS to establish a 
base of operations on their territory after being expelled from Syria.49  HAMAS was 
originally told to leave Jordan in 1999 on the request of the United States.  Jordan has 
said that it will not allow HAMAS to use Jordan as a launching pad for operations, but 
will allow the leadership and their families to live in the country.50  Allowing HAMAS 
back into Jordan is perceived as a slap in the face to the United States, but it is unlikely to 
change security assistance, unless Jordanian leadership were to turn a blind eye to 
nefarious activities conducted by HAMAS.   
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 The move to mend relations with HAMAS is the King’s attempt to bolster his 
reputation in the Arab world.  Jordan is not a member of the GCC, so it does not have to 
support afforded to the other monarchies.  The King needs to appease its neighbors.  
Allowing HAMAS back into the country may placate the rebelling Palestinians inside of 
Jordan and the bordering West Bank.  There is also a fear that the United States could 
abandon it, like it did to Mubarak of Egypt.    
Kingdom of Bahrain 
 The Kingdom of Bahrain, a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council, is an island 
off of the Arabian Peninsula connected to Saudi Arabia by the King Fahd Causeway.  It 
has been ruled by the al-Khalifa family since 1971.  The King, Shaykh Hamad bin Isa al-
Khalifa has ruled since 1999.  His uncle is the unelected Prime Minister, who has held 
power for over forty years.51 
 The Kingdom is ruled by a Sunni minority, keeping the Shia majority repressed.  
The military and government services are dominated by Sunni.  Bahrain has gone so far 
to offer positions in the military and government to foreign Sunnis in order to keep the 
jobs from going to its Shias.52   
Security Relationship with the United States 
The deep U.S. – Bahrain security relationship is the 
cornerstone for our collective security in the Gulf region. 
Home to our sole main operating base in the Mid-East, 
Bahrain provides key support for U.S. interests by hosting 
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U.S. Navy’s 5th Fleet and providing facilities for other U.S. 
forces engaged in regional security. (GEN Mattis)53 
 In 2002, President George W. Bush designated Bahrain a “major non-
NATO ally,” which allows Bahrain to purchase the same weapons and enter into 
some of the cooperation afforded to NATO members.54  The pinnacle of the U.S.-
Bahrain relationship is Naval Support Activity-Bahrain (NSA-B).  NSA-B is the 
home of Fifth Fleet and the naval component of USCENTCOM (NAVCENT).   
Approximately 5,000 U.S. personnel are stationed in Bahrain and at any given 
time it houses the command and control of 30,000 personnel and thirty ships 
operating in the region.55  The base alone is a reason for U.S. to encourage 
security cooperation with Bahrain. 
 The United States also has a bilateral defense pact with Bahrain.  The pact 
provides access to NSA-B, air bases, and pre-positioned strategic munitions; in 
return, Bahrain receives consultations if its security is threatened, training 
exercises, and increased training for its forces.  The pact was first signed in 1991 
and has been renewed until 2016.56      
 Bahrain is a recipient of Foreign Military Funds, International Military 
Education and Training, and Excess Defense Article transfers.  FMF is used to 
modernize Bahrain’s fleet of F-16s, maintain U.S. origin weapons, air defense, 
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and counter-terrorism operations.57  During the unrest in Bahrain, the United 
States placed a hold on any equipment that could potentially be used against 
protesters, as the United States-provided equipment is for defense against external 
threats and to aid in U.S. operations.  The hold came about after it became known 
that Bahrain had a shipment of Humvees and TOW anti-tank weapons scheduled 
for delivery.58   
 In May 2012, the United States announced that it would allow Bahrain to 
purchase equipment for its defense forces, Coast Guard, and National Guard.  
This equipment included: harbor security boats, upgraded engines for F-16 
aircraft, and additional air-to-air missiles.59  
Bahrain’s Arab Spring Experience 
 The protests in Bahrain began in February 2011 and were conducted largely by 
the Shia population.  Their demands were to alter the constitution to allow greater 
authority to the Council of Representatives (COR), to allow the Shias to gain a majority 
in the COR, to provide job opportunities, and to replace the current prime minister.  The 
government was quick to use force to stop the demonstrations, but after a month of 
continued protests it attempted to meet some demands.60   
 After mediation efforts failed and violence continued, the GCC’s Peninsula Shield 
Force was deployed to Bahrain to end the protests.  The Saudi led Peninsula Shield Force 
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stayed for four months and saw an end to the demonstrations, allowing the Bahraini 
government to gain the upper hand.61      
Public Opinion: Bahrain witnessed some of the most violent protests of the GCC 
countries.  King Hamad has attempted reform since he took the throne from his father; 
however, the al-Khalifa royal family remains in control of the government and will not 
compromise on the suggestion of change.  The country is divided socially between the 
Sunnis and Shias, and the protests were a mirror image of that chasm.62  The Shia 
protested and the Sunni security forces cracked down.  It was in the Sunnis’ best interest 
to keep the Shia repressed as their demands could fundamentally change the Sunni’s 
accustomed way of living. 
 The Bahraini GDP does not originate from rent as does other oil wealthy 
countries in the GCC, but its strategic location means that it will always receive funding 
from Saudi Arabia and the United States.  This keeps the monarchy in power and 
encourages it to maintain the status quo.  The government conducted the Bahrain 
Independent Commission of Inquiry to investigate the uprisings and provide suggestions 
for reform.  The recommendations for reform and constitutional changes were made, but 
rejected by the opposition as not going far enough.63 
 Freedom House rates Bahrain as “Not Free.”  The government has banned all 
public rallies and demonstrations, revoked the citizenship of some activists, and arrested 
thousands of protesters.64  As mentioned above, the United States has succumbed to some 
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international pressure to halt support to the regime, but it still may have tarnished its 
image internationally. 
Common Threat: Iran poses the largest threat to Bahrain and is a threat shared with the 
United States.  The Kingdom fears that Iran has the ability to influence its Shia majority 
going so far as to call the uprising a “foreign plot” against the country.65   Their fears may 
not be too far-fetched, as the former Iranian parliament speaker labeled Bahrain Iran’s 
“fourteenth province.”66  This fear of Iranian interference will ensure Bahrain remains 
amenable to U.S. security interests in the region despite regional uprisings.  This fear will 
also keep them a recipient of Saudi Arabian support. 
 Saudi Arabia fears that the protests in Bahrain will spread to their Shia population 
on the east coast and impact their oil production.67  They also fear that if the monarchy 
were to fall in Bahrain, there is a good possibility that the idea will spread that 
monarchies could fall elsewhere.  Therefore, Saudi Arabia will do their best to prevent 
unrest across the GCC monarchies.  It is Saudi Arabia’s best interest to keep the 
monarchies stable, and that would maintain Bahrain’s relationship with the United States.  
Conclusion 
 As described in the case studies, Bahrain and Jordan endured their own versions 
of the Arab Spring that revolved around the populace desiring more opportunities and 
greater representation in government.  The similarities of the uprisings in the GCC 
countries, Jordan and Morocco, are that the population did not call for the fall of the 
                                                          
65 Katzman, Kenneth, “Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy,” Congressional Research Service, (Oct 
2012) pp 28-29 http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/95-1013.pdf (accessed 25 Nov 2012). 
66 The Telegraph, “Bahrain as ‘Iran’s Fourteenth Province,’” (Feb 2011) 
http://www.iranian.com/main/news/2011/02/17/bahrain-irans-fourteenth-province (accessed 25 Nov 2012). 
67 Katzman, Kenneth, “Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy,” Congressional Research Service, (Oct 
2012) pp 31 http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/95-1013.pdf (accessed 25 Nov 2012). 
34 
 
regime until promised reforms were either not enacted or were seen as merely lip-service.  
With the regimes in place, security cooperation isn’t likely to change. 
 Additionally, during the Arab Spring, public opinion in the monarchies never 
called for a change of relationship with the United States.  Public protests focused on 
equal rights, representation in the government, and fair wages.  The monarchies made 
limited concessions to appease the demands of the public.  If the population started to 
protest its nation’s relationship with the United States with the same fervor as the initial 
stages of the Arab Spring, and place blame on the United States for its current situation, 
then the government would likely reassess the position they have with American 
involvement in the region.  However, as it stands the Arab Spring has not changed public 
opinion in regards to security cooperation in the GCC countries, Jordan and Morocco. 
 The threat of internal and external actors remains a constant factor in changing a 
security relationship.  In regards to the GCC countries, Jordan and Morocco, the dual 
threat of Islamic extremism and Iranian influence remains the same before and after Arab 
Spring.  The double threat encourages the countries to seek security cooperation with the 
United States as the guarantor of security.  The “common threat” and U.S. interests in the 
region will enable the United States to continue encouraging such cooperation.   
 The changing political atmospheres of neighboring countries have created a sense 
of uncertainty.  The United States has supported the regimes for so long, that cooperation 
will be seen as a source of stability.  As long as the United States applauds reform efforts, 
the monarchies will be encouraged to continue cooperation.  In contrast, there is also 
suspicion of U.S. policy in the region.  The monarchies have witnessed the United States 
“betrayal” of long-time allies in the region (Egypt’s Mubarak) and they may question the 
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resiliency of its alliances.  This suggests the possibility of pushing the GCC countries 
together into stronger military alliances to support themselves or to seek a new or 
additional partner elsewhere.        
 Although, the relationships with the United States has arguably remained the 
same following the advent of Arab Spring, there is still a potential that they could change 
if protests continue.  Public opinion did cause the monarchies to make token reforms and 
in some cases those reforms were successful in diverting or delaying the uprisings.  It 
may be too early to say whether the Arab Spring will ultimately bring the monarchies 
























CHAPTER 2: The Failure of ‘Responsibility to Protect:’ A Comparison of the 
Conflicts in Libya and Syria 
After the Arab Spring and the subsequent unrest across the Middle East and North 
Africa, it has become increasingly apparent that several governments have failed to 
protect their citizens from atrocities, and in most cases the governments themselves have 
been the perpetrators.  On their own initiative the populations of several countries forced 
regime change; including those in Egypt, Tunisia, and Yemen.  Libya and Syria became 
embroiled in armed internal conflicts, with the conflict in Syria currently ongoing.   The 
situations in both Libya and Syria are similar in the way the unrest unfolded and how 
their respective governments reacted, but each case has been treated differently by the 
international community.   
In March 2011, only one month after the unrest began in Libya, the United 
Nations (UN) authorized armed humanitarian intervention (“Responsibility to Protect”) 
to stop Muammar Qadhafi from killing anymore of his people.  However, in Syria, the 
conflict has been continuing without pause since March 2011.  It has evolved into a civil 
war, where the UN has reported the death toll to be over 100,000 and rising daily.68  
Additionally, well over two million civilians have fled the country as refugees.69  Under 
the UN’s concept of “Responsibility to Protect,” the international community has a 
responsibility to defend the citizens of countries that have failed to protect their own.  In 
fact, the principles of “Responsibility to Protect” were used as justification for the 
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intervention in Libya.70  This raises the question, that if “Responsibility to Protect” was 
used to justify the intervention in Libya, why does the concept not compel intervention in 
Syria?     
 In order to answer this question, it is important to first understand the nature of 
“Responsibility to Protect,” and then examine its relevance in the context of the Libyan 
and Syrian conflicts.  Following this examination, I will identify the differences between 
the situations in Libya and Syria and determine whether Syria meets the proposed R2P 
criteria for armed intervention as Libya did, and identify how “Responsibility to Protect” 
is implemented under the auspices of the UN.  First, it is necessary to examine 
humanitarian intervention and the policy of “Responsibility to Protect,” which is an 
emerging international norm, but not a legally binding framework for intervention.   
Humanitarian Intervention 
 Humanitarian intervention is a vague term; from a body of scholarship on the 
topic, it is best described as “coercive action by one or more states involving the use of 
armed force in another state without the consent of its authorities, and with the purpose of 
preventing the widespread suffering or death among the inhabitants.”71  Humanitarian 
intervention isn’t just military direct action, as it is popularly depicted; it instead is a 
blanket concept that covers a range of options available to the international community.  
Prior to armed conflict, the international community normally engages in other coercive 
action, such as diplomatic efforts and sanctions to influence the offending government.   
                                                          
70 NPR, “Obama’s Speech on Libya: ‘A Responsibility to Act’,” (March 28, 2011) 
http://www.npr.org/2011/03/28/134935452/obamas-speech-on-libya-a-responsibility-to-act (accessed 4 
May 2014). 
71 Palmer, Alex, “Evil by Any Other Name: Humanitarian Intervention in the 21st Century,” Harvard 
International Review (Fall 2010) p32. 
38 
 
The international community’s failure to effectively respond to the events in 
Rwanda and the unilateral actions taken by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) in Kosovo, drive the debate for and against humanitarian intervention 
operations.  It wasn’t until after the NATO intervention in Kosovo that the international 
community gave the concept of humanitarian intervention more attention.72  In 2005, the 
UN officially began referring to humanitarian intervention as the “Responsibility to 
Protect.”73  For the purpose of this chapter I will use both terms interchangeably.   
The literature surrounding “Responsibility to Protect” focuses on arguments for 
and against intervention.  Consistently, the basis of these arguments is the selective 
nature of intervention: why intrude in the affairs of one state and not the other?  
Humanitarian intervention is seen by some theorists as an excuse by a stronger state to 
breach the sovereignty of another to further its own interests, which results in policy or 
regime change.  In other words, to some, humanitarian intervention occurs as a country or 
group of countries violates the sovereignty of another State to essentially meddle in its 
domestic affairs.   
Humanitarian intervention is always a controversial subject; the international 
community is either doing too much or not enough; it often is driven by moral or legal 
reasons which are viewed differently by those on opposing sides.74  Before delving into 
the arguments and controversies surrounding “Responsibility to Protect,” and how those 
arguments are applied to the conflicts in Libya and Syria, it is first important to examine 
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the efforts the international community has taken to institutionalize and legalize 
humanitarian intervention.  
ICISS and Responsibility to Protect 
In 2001, an ad hoc body, the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty (ICISS), was established to aid the international community and the United 
Nations in finding a common ground on the issue of humanitarian intervention and to 
address the challenges associated with its selective application.  ICISS was composed of 
Canadian government officials and members of the UN General Assembly.  Their 
primary goal was to answer the question of when it is “appropriate for states to take 
coercive action, against another state for the purpose of protecting people at risk in that 
other state.”75  One of the Commission’s main challenges was the issue of sovereignty, 
because by its nature, humanitarian intervention is a violation of another state’s 
sovereignty.  To work around this problem, they changed the terminology of 
humanitarian intervention to “Responsibility to Protect” or R2P.  Sovereignty was also 
characterized as causing a state to have inherent responsibilities, and one of those 
responsibilities was to protect its own people.76 
The overarching theme of R2P, as envisioned by the ICISS, is that first a 
sovereign government is responsible for the protection of its own people. If a government 
is unable to provide that protection or if the government is causing harm to its people, 
then it is the responsibility of the international community to protect the people, and 
national sovereignty becomes second to the international community’s responsibility to 
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protect.77  The Commission established three principles of R2P: the international 
community has the responsibility to prevent (address the cause of unrest before it 
becomes a humanitarian crisis), the responsibility to react (respond with appropriate 
means to end a humanitarian crisis), and the responsibility to rebuild (recovery, 
reconstruction, and reconciliation).  ICISS also established six criteria that must be met 
before military intervention is appropriate.  The criteria proposed by ICISS are:  
Just Cause: ICISS gave two events that would offer a just cause to military intervention.  
One is a large scale loss of life which is caused by the state or caused because the state 
could not prevent it.78  The other is large scale ethnic cleansing.  A just cause under the 
ICISS report is not intervention to restore democracy or intervention to protect its own 
citizens in the offending country.79  Just cause does not allow regime removal unless it 
can be proven without a doubt that the regime is the cause of the loss of life.80 
Right Intention:  The motive of the intervening state or states should be to stop human 
suffering despite other interests the state may have or other reasons the state may have for 
intervening.81 
Last Resort:  Military force should only be used after every other non-violent option has 
been used.  Non-violent options include among others, economic sanctions, embargos, 
and diplomatic efforts.82 
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Legitimate Authority: Under ICISS, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is the 
best authority to grant military intervention on humanitarian grounds.83   
Proportional Means: The duration and intensity of the force used in intervention should 
only be enough to secure the humanitarian objective.84 
Reasonable Prospect: There must be a chance for success in stopping the humanitarian 
crisis, without causing more harm than good.85 
The criteria for military intervention used by ICISS are similar to the criteria 
established in the Just War Theory for jus ad bellum (justice of resort to war) and jus in 
bello (justice in the conduct of war).  Just War Theory sets moral constraints and 
conditions for war; thus, logically, the responsibility to protect is derived from Just War 
Theory, in a humanitarian scenario.86   
The ICISS developed the criteria to constrain countries from using R2P as an 
excuse for invasion and furthering their own national interests.  It was also intended to 
make intervention selectivity more transparent.87  In theory, if all the criteria were met, 
intervention would be a “Just War” as defined by Just War Theory.  Arguably, this would 
make it difficult for a member of the UNSC to use a veto, because doing so would 
essentially be a failure to meet the “Responsibility to Protect.”   
However, while certain recommendations of the ICISS report were adopted by the 
UN, the criteria listed above were not. The United States, China, and Russia opposed the 
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idea for having to meet a set criterion before committing to armed intervention.  The 
United States felt that criteria would constrain its ability to act; while China and Russia 
believed the criteria would be used to circumvent the UNSC.88  Regardless, the criteria 
are an appropriate tool to analyze the international community’s rationale and 
selectiveness for armed humanitarian intervention.    
Actions of the United Nations General Assembly 
 The UN took the ICISS report into consideration and adopted certain elements to 
create the policy of “Responsibility to Protect.”  The affirmation of R2P was announced 
in a resolution adopted by the General Assembly at the 2005 World Summit which 
identified  four events that would automatically trigger  “Responsibility to Protect:” 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. 89   
The UN developed three pillars to implement responsibility to protect.  These pillars 
generally mirror the principles of the ICISS report and are:  
Pillar One: The Protection Responsibilities of the State.  The state is responsible for the 
protection of its people from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against 
humanity.90   
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Pillar Two: International Assistance and Capacity Building.  The international 
community has a responsibility to help the state with its responsibility to protect.91 
Pillar Three: Timely and Decisive Response.  This is the responsibility of the 
international community to “respond collectively in a timely and decisive manner when a 
State is manifestly failing to provide such protection.”92  There are many options for the 
international community to use as a response; military action is to be the last. 
The Counter-Argument 
In one of his many arguments against humanitarian intervention, political activist 
Noam Chomsky writes that there has never been a pure humanitarian intervention; rather 
states are motivated by their own interests.93  This is the crux of the disagreement.  The 
implementation of humanitarian intervention is selective and conducted primarily when 
states have an interest.  In other words, a state is motivated by its interests and the plight 
of humanity alone is rarely strong enough to motivate a state to intervene abroad.94   
The United States, and by extension NATO, has used humanitarian intervention 
as one of the reasons for its conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, Kosovo, and most 
recently in Libya.  It has also not been implemented in other places and events where it 
would seem logical to use humanitarian intervention because of the similarities.  
Examples include: Rwanda, where mass genocide occurred, and now Syria, which is 
quickly becoming a humanitarian disaster.  As mentioned previously, humanitarian 
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intervention is seen by some governments, as the strong forcing their will on the weak; or 
as Noam Chomsky cites Thucydides, “the strong do as they wish, while the weak suffer 
as they must.”95   
Establishing the right intention (the first ICISS criteria) prior to intervention may 
be an answer to the selectiveness of humanitarian intervention.  If the intervening country 
has the right intention, it will intercede in the situation, solve the problem at hand and 
then leave.  Brian Orend argues for adding additional criteria to the Just War Theory that 
would require a state to commit itself to rules of conduct during war and have a 
predetermined termination.96  In Orend’s theory, a state would fight only for the sake of a 
just cause and for no other reason.97  The predetermined termination of military action 
would, in theory, prevent the intervening party from pursuing its own interests and would 
oblige it to concentrate on the task at hand.  The nation doing the intervening would also 
have to declare its intentions for humanitarian intervention publicly; questions would be 
asked if the country were to stray from the pre-intercession announced objective. 
Similarly, Michael Walzer argues that a true humanitarian intervention occurs 
when the military forces are “quickly in and out.”98  In essence, military forces intercede 
and assist the people with the immediate problem causing the crisis and then leave the 
people to their own devices.  Walzer admits that in most interventions this is easier said 
than done.     
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ICISS described multilateral intervention as the best way to maintain the 
appropriate intention.  Multilateral is defined as multiple countries acting together, 
generally after a consensus has been achieved from an international governing body.  In 
this scenario a “coalition of the willing” is formed to intervene on a people’s behalf and 
do so on the authority of the United Nations.  The 2012 international operation in Libya 
offers a good example of multilateral intervention.  
Conversely, there is also an argument for unilateral humanitarian intervention 
without the consent of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).  Although, not 
always followed, a State is supposed to seek the approval of the UNSC before resorting 
to the use of force and military intervention on humanitarian grounds is not exempt.  For 
example, in 1999, NATO implemented a unilateral humanitarian intervention in Kosovo 
to stop the ethnic cleansing of the Albanians by the Serbians.  NATO bypassed the UNSC 
to avoid the inevitable veto of the operation by Russia and/or China.  There was objection 
to NATO’s actions, but ultimately it became the catalyst for creating “Responsibility to 
Protect.”  The UN deemed NATO’s actions in Kosovo as illegal and a threat to 
international order, but that it “should be morally approved because the law cannot be 
allowed to block humanitarian intervention in exceptional cases of humanitarian 
emergency.”99          
As alluded to previously, if one of the Permanent Five of the UNSC does not want 
intervention to happen, it won’t.  Russia and China, both Permanent Five members, 
generally oppose R2P.  When asked about NATO’s intervention in Kosovo, Russian 
president, Vladmir Putin said “We never would have agreed to that type of interference in 
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the internal affairs of another country.  That type of behavior simply cannot be justified, 
even for so-called humanitarian reasons.”100  Russia, did however, use humanitarian 
intervention as their explanation for their invasion of the Republic of Georgia in 2008.101  
China opposes R2P on the grounds that it is a breach of sovereignty.  China feels that 
human rights abuses and massacres are a domestic or regional issue.  The Chinese special 
envoy for Darfur was quoted as saying, “it is not China’s Darfur, it is first Sudan’s Darfur 
and then Africa’s Darfur.”102    
When establishing the “Responsibility to Protect,” ICISS attempted to resolve 
many of these issues.  They gave a warning to the Permanent Five of the UNSC in 
regards to this legitimate authority criterion.  The Commission said “they should agree 
not to apply their veto power…to obstruct the passage of resolutions authorizing military 
intervention for humanitarian protection purposes for which there is majority support.”103  
In other words, according to the ICISS, the UNSC would be failing its responsibility to 
protect if it were to veto a humanitarian intervention.    
The Argument in Regards to Libya 
 There are telling differences between the situations in Libya and Syria that impact 
the international responsibility to protect in regards to both conflicts.  Libya was the first 
intervention after the United Nation’s affirmation of “Responsibility to Protect,” 
essentially making it a test case.  As anticipated, the intervention had its supporters and 
detractors.  The legality of the Libyan intervention is questioned by some scholars and 
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most importantly by Russia and China.  This is primarily due to the fact that the mission 
ultimately ended in regime change when that wasn’t the original goal.  Yevgeny Voronin, 
a Russian scholar, argues that the use of force was approved too quickly, and sanctions 
and diplomatic efforts were not given enough time to work.104  In this argument the 
ICISS criterion of last resort may not have been fully met, according to Voronin.  
Additionally, NATO was given authority to use force; however, it was also given the 
leeway to interpret what the use of force meant, which allowed the mission to evolve as 
deemed necessary by NATO.105   
 Gareth Evans, former Australian Foreign Minister and leading member of ICISS, 
described the intervention in Libya as “Responsibility to Protect” coming of age.  
According to him, it was a text book phased response that ultimately led to a successful 
military intervention by the international community.106  In this view, the Libyan conflict 
justified “Responsibility to Protect.”  It was authorized by the UNSC quickly, and it was 
conducted by NATO and allies from the Middle East in a coalition of the willing.107  
However, humanitarian intervention morphed into regime change in what is seen by 
many as “mission creep.”  Mission creep is the expansion of a mission beyond its original 
goals, and it is a concern when contemplating humanitarian intervention.   It creates the 
need to declare the intention of intervention beforehand.  Libya’s Operation UNIFIED 
PROTECTOR is a good example of mission creep; it was originally intended to be a no-
                                                          
104 Voronin, Yevgeny, “The Problem of the Legitimacy of Armed Intervention: Casus Belli Libya,” 
International Affairs Vol. 58 No. 5 (2012) p198-199. 
105 Ibid. 
106 Evans, Gareth, “The Responsibility to Protect Comes of Age,” Project Syndicate (26 Oct 2011) 
http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-responsibility-to-protect-comes-of-age (accessed 9 Apr 
2013).   
107 Zifcak, Spencer, “The Responsibility to Protect After Libya and Syria,” Melbourne Journal of 
International Law Vol. 13 (2012) p61. 
48 
 
fly-zone to prevent the regime from attacking opposition forces, but as the conflict 
evolved, NATO forces were used to provide air support to allow the opposition to 
eliminate Qadhafi. 
Case Study 
In order to determine how the concept of R2P justified intervention in Libya and 
not in Syria, I must compare the two conflicts.  Libya will be used as the accepted model 
for “Responsibility to Protect” to compare and contrast what is taking place in Syria since 
the beginning of the unrest.  I will examine the UN’s Three Pillars associated with 
“Responsibility to Protect,” and how they have been implemented in both countries.   
 Then, to analyze whether armed intervention is appropriate and necessary, I will 
compare the two conflicts using the ICISS criteria for armed humanitarian intervention.  
Although the six criteria for military intervention were never formally adopted by the 
international community, they are fundamental criteria for a Just War and can arguably 
be used as a “checklist” to determine the feasibility of an armed intervention.  For the 
purpose of this chapter, I will use the ICISS criteria to determine if the elements for a 
moral armed humanitarian intervention are in place.    
It can be hypothesized that the difference between Libya and Syria is that the 
members of the UNSC did not have any over-riding national interests in the Libyan 
regime; national interests in Syria will limit the legitimate authority criterion.  
Additionally, the Libyan regime lacked the external support that the Syrian regime 
enjoys; this will hinder a reasonable prospect for success.    
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Libya vs. Syria: Responsibility to Protect 
The following sections will briefly apply the UN pillars to both conflicts, and then 
analyze the criteria for armed intervention in the final pillar of Responsibility to Protect.   
Pillar One:  As explained by the United Nations report A/63/677, the first pillar of the 
“Responsibility to Protect” falls on the nation to protect its own people from harm.  Both 
Libya and Syria failed to meet that responsibility.  In both cases, the leaders used military 
force against unarmed protesters. 
In Libya, mass protests began on 17 February 2011 calling for Muammar Qadhafi 
to step down as the country’s leader.  A week later Qadhafi authorized the military to 
“crush” the uprising, calling the protestors “cockroaches.”108  There were reports of 
snipers firing into crowds of protestors and regime use of artillery, helicopter gunships, 
and jets to kill civilians.109  Additionally, Qadhafi was rumored to have deployed foreign 
mercenaries who would kill at will.  The crisis quickly escalated with the development of 
an armed rebellion made up of military defectors and civilians. 
 The possible use of foreign mercenaries or militia is significant.  This allows the 
threatened government to have plausible deniability in the eyes of the international 
community, while its people “know” that it is violence sanctioned by the government.  
Foreign militias/mercenaries will also not be as constrained by guilt in conducting acts of 
violence against the populace.  For example a Chadian mercenary employed by Qadhafi 
to kill Libyans may not hesitate, while a Libyan soldier ordered to kill fellow Libyans 
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will likely think twice.  This same idea can be applied to a specific ethnic or religious 
militia dispatched to kill a different group of people, while sharing the same nationality.  
This is seen in Syria with the government’s use of the Shabiha, which consists of the pro-
regime Alawite sect. 
In Syria, anti-government protests began sporadically in March 2011.  The 
government focused its suppression tactics in the areas most prone to be anti-regime.  
One of the most significant events was the capture of a 13 year old boy by regime forces.  
His mutilated body was discovered on the doorstep of his family’s home.110  In reaction 
to his murder, peaceful protests erupted across the country; they were met with military 
force.  Assad justified his reaction by claiming his country was under attack from 
terrorists who were supported by foreign conspirators.111  Similar to Qadhafi, Assad used 
a pro-government militia known as Shabiha to conduct killings.  Also in parallel to the 
Libyan conflict, military defectors and civilians formed an armed rebellion to fight the 
government.   
Pillar Two:  Pillar Two of “Responsibility to Protect” is the international community’s 
responsibility to assist the nation with upholding its obligation to protect its own people.  
The United Nations did exercise Pillar Two in both Libya and Syria.  However, Pillar 
Two does seem to give some leeway to those already committing crimes against 
humanity: “those contemplating the incitement or perpetration of crimes and violations 
relating to the responsibility to protect need to be made to understand both the costs of 
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pursuing that path and the potential benefits of seeking peaceful reconciliation and 
development instead.”112  It goes without saying that “crimes and violations relating to 
the responsibility to protect” were already taking place, however the United Nations still 
needed to remind the regimes of their responsibility to protect their people from crimes 
against humanity. 
On 22 February 2011, after Qadhafi authorized force to root out the protesters, the 
UN Secretary General Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide and the Special Advisor on 
R2P released a press statement expressing their concern over the reports of violence in 
Libya.  They warned the Libyan government that if the attacks were as bad as reported, 
they may be accountable under crimes against humanity.  They finished the statement by 
reminding the government of their responsibility to protect.113  On 25 February 2011, the 
United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) passed a 
resolution on the situation in Libya.  It called on the Libyan government to release 
detained persons, stop attacks on civilians, ensure their safety, and unblock access to 
communications.  It also “reminded Libya of its obligations…to uphold the highest 
standards of human rights” and guarantee access for human rights organizations to 
Libya.114  It is also important to note, that the actions taken by the Libyan government 
against its own people were widely condemned, even by the Arab League, Organization 
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of Islamic Cooperation, and the African Union.  All called for talks between the 
opposition and the government, in the hopes of mediating a ceasefire.115   
Pillar Two events took place in Syria, as they did in Libya, but in a protracted 
amount of time.  This was largely due to the Russian and Chinese concern that armed 
intervention and regime change was the ultimate goal.  As in the Libyan situation, The 
United Nations Special Advisors on the Responsibility to Protect and the Prevention of 
Genocide issued a series of press releases that condemned the Syrian Governments use of 
violence and possible human rights violations.  The statements began in June 2011 and 
started with concern about loss of life from the result of government suppression and 
reminded the Syrian Government of their responsibility under R2P.116  The releases 
continued in this vein for several months.   
In March 2012, after a full year of government led violence, the Special Advisors’ 
frustration with UNSC inaction could be seen in the following statements, “Clearly, the 
Government has manifestly failed to protect the Syrian population.  It has resorted to 
extreme violence, instead of allowing the Syrian people to freely express their opinions 
and make their voices heard about the fate of their country.”117  The release ended calling 
on the government to stop the violence, and pleading with the international community 
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“to take collective action, utilizing the full range of tools available under the United 
Nations Charter, to protect populations at risk.”118   
Pillar Three: Pillar Three is the international community’s responsibility to protect 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity in 
the case that the nation in question has failed to do so.  This is to be done first with 
diplomatic and humanitarian means, and then if nothing else works, the international 
community can and should resort to force.119  It was ICISS’s intent that prior to the 
international community’s commitment to military intervention, that it would first meet 
the previously identified criteria. 
Just Cause: As identified above, when discussing Pillar One in regard to both Libya and 
Syria, both countries had failed in their responsibility to protect their populations from 
crimes against humanity.  This in itself is arguably enough to determine a just cause for 
armed humanitarian intervention. 
Right Intention: Right intention for military intervention is hard to prove, especially 
when led by the West.  Generally, given a history of colonialism, the world is suspicious 
of the West’s actions in the developing world.  It is seen as the strong imposing their will 
on the weak.  A multi-lateral coalition “of the willing” is the most appropriate to 
represent the international community’s interests when resorting to force.  In the case of 
Libya, the intention was to implement a “no fly zone” to allow the rebels’ freedom of 
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movement and to “level the playing field.”  It essentially prevented Qadhafi’s forces from 
using jets and helicopters to kill civilians.  It also allowed the rebels to establish a safe 
haven in Benghazi, where they could form a transitional government.  The intent became 
questionable when the coalition began to provide air support for the rebels and support 
them in their endeavor to overthrow Qadhafi.  To summarize, in Libya the right intention 
existed, but it was allowed to morph during the heat of the conflict.  This is an underlying 
factor in the reasons why some in the international community, specifically Russia and 
China, are concerned about the true intention of intervention in Syria. 
 The right intention for military intervention in Syria should be obvious as it was 
with Libya, to prevent continuous killing of civilians.  However, if led by the West, there 
are those who offer many objections to cause doubt of the true intention of intervention.  
For instance, Iran holds significant influence over the al-Asad Alawite regime and 
provides military support through proxy.  Syria is arguably its only foothold in the 
Middle East.  Western military intervention could possibly be seen as a war to deny 
Iranian influence in the region.  Russia also challenges the West’s right intention in Syria.  
The Russian ambassador to the UN said, “It’s all about Iran.”  The invasion of Iraq 
inadvertently strengthened Iran and now “requires the West to weaken Tehran by 
challenging its ally in Damascus.”120 
Russia also holds interests in Syria.  Similar to Iran, Syria is one of Russia’s only 
allies in the Middle East.  It maintains extensive security cooperation through arms sales 
and maintains a naval base on the West Coast.  It is likely that a post-Asad Syria may not 
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be as friendly, so maintaining the status quo in Syria and preventing Western influence is 
in Russia’s best interests.   
Last Resort: Military intervention should be the last action after every non-violent means 
has been exasperated.  In Libya, the UN passed Resolution 1970 on 26 February 2011 
one week after the violence began.  Resolution 1970 referred the Libyan situation to the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) to determine whether human rights violations had 
been committed.  It also ordered an arms embargo, issued a travel ban and froze the 
assets of individuals complicit in human rights abuses.  Additionally, it called on Member 
States to assist the return of humanitarian organizations to Libya.121  Despite the 
sanctions, the Government of Libya did not stop the systematic killing of civilians.  On 
17 March 2011, Resolution 1973 was passed.   
Resolution 1973 demanded the establishment of a cease-fire, recognized the 
efforts of the UN Special Envoy to Libya and the African Union to establish a dialogue, 
and demanded that the Libyan Government comply with its “Responsibility to Protect.”  
It also authorized the Member States to “take all necessary measures…to protect civilians 
and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya…” 
without deploying foreign forces on Libyan territory.122  The Resolution would give 
authority to enforce a no-fly-zone over Libya and enforce the arms embargo ordered 
under Resolution 1970.  
 On 29 April 2011, in Syria, the UN Human Rights Council passed Resolution S-
16/1.  The Resolution condemned the Syrian Governments use of violence on civilians 
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and called on them to use restraint.123  Several countries to include Russia and China 
were against the adoption of the Resolution on the reason that the situation was a 
domestic issue.124   While some countries wanted to impose sanctions while other 
countries thought that sanctions were too much interference in Syrian affairs.   
 Despite a lack of UNSC action, the Arab League suspended Syria’s membership, 
and imposed economic and political sanctions.  Arab League observers were also 
deployed to the country to determine the extent of the human rights violations.  The 
observer’s actions were largely dictated by the regime, and they did little to stall the 
violence.  In March 2013, the Arab League weakened the legitimacy of the al-Asad 
regime by giving Syrian membership to the opposition.125 
 Russia and China vetoed three draft UNSC resolutions that threatened sanctions 
against the al-Asad regime if they didn’t stop the violence.126  However, there are limited 
sanctions implemented by individual states and regional organizations.  The United States 
has sanctions that have been place since before the revolution.  The sanctions generally 
restrict aid and trade.  The European Union (EU) imposed sanctions after the revolution.  
EU sanctions include asset freezes and travel bans on the Syrian regime, arms embargo, 
sanctions on Syrian central bank, and bans on the import of Syrian oil and export of 
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equipment for the petrol industry.127  The Syrian regime still receives aid from countries 
like Russia, Iran, and Iraq. 
Legitimate Authority: Approval by the UNSC would serve as legitimate authority for 
military intervention.  Although several countries abstained from voting for UNSCR 1973 
authorizing intervention in Libya, no country exercised their veto.  Additionally the Arab 
League requested that the UN implement the no-fly-zone, giving intervention regional 
legitimacy.128  The ICC had also issued arrest warrants for Muammar Qadhafi, his son 
Saif al-Islam Qadhafi, and Libyan Director of Military Intelligence Abdallah al-Senussi 
for crimes against humanity.129  
 As it stands in April 2013, military intervention in Syria lacks legitimate 
authority.  The UNSC is unable to pass a resolution.  China and Russia have vetoed all 
draft resolutions, claiming that the resolutions are unbalanced and fail to condemn the 
regime and the opposition equally.  They believe that the West is intent on regime change 
and are attempting to use R2P as the excuse to make it happen.130   
Proportional Means: Intervention must only last as long and be as intense as necessary 
to provide humanitarian assistance.  Intervention in Libya under UNSCR 1973 became 
contentious after it transitioned to regime change.  The coalition defended their actions by 
explaining that the only way to defend the population was to remove Qadhafi.  If he were 
to remain in place then civilians would continue to be in danger.  After the conflict, the 
                                                          
127 Masters, Jonathan, “Syria’s Crisis and the Global Response,” Council on Foreign Relations (3 Apr 
2013) http://www.cfr.org/syria/syrias-crisis-global-response/p28402 (accessed 9 Apr 2013). 
128 Leiby, Richard, Mansour, Muhammad, “Arab League Asks U.N. for No-Fly Zone Over Libya,” The 
Washington Post (12 Mar 2012) http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-03-12/world/35208628_1_arab-
league-gaddafi-moussa (accessed 9 Apr 2013). 
129 Coalition for the International Criminal Court, “Cases & Situations > Libya,” 
http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=libya (accessed 9 Apr 2013). 
130 Zifcak, Spencer, “The Responsibility to Protect After Libya and Syria,” Melbourne Journal of 
International Law Vol. 13 (2012) p83. 
58 
 
UNSC passed Resolution 2009 that established the United Nations Support Mission in 
Libya (UNSMIL).  UNSMIL was authorized to assist the Libyans in restoring public 
security and establishing a new government.131  This criterion of proportional means does 
not yet apply to Syria.  
Reasonable Prospect: Military intervention must not cause more harm than good, in 
other words, the success of military intervention should, as much as possible, be certain.  
Libya was a pariah state and had few, if any, allies.  Since Qadhafi took control of Libya 
in a coup he has feared the same fate.  This can be seen in the way he kept his military 
weak, and instead employed foreign mercenaries and maintained a robust regime 
protection force.  His military was quick to defect and were no match for a NATO-
backed opposition. 
 The Libyan rebels also had a plan to govern after the fall of Qadhafi.  The 
opposition was recognized early on in the conflict as the “legitimate authority of the 
Libyan people” in the guise of their political wing, the National Transitional Council 
(NTC).  The armed opposition was united in their cause to topple Qadhafi.  The NTC and 
the united opposition allowed the UN to conduct air operations and then leave the 
transitional government to their own devices, albeit with some international support.   
 Unlike Libya, a reasonable prospect of a successful intervention may not exist in 
Syria.  Besides Russian political support, the Iranians have trained the militia being 
deployed against the populace and Syrian opposition.  They are well armed and loyal.  
The regime also maintains a large stockpile of chemical weapons that are dispersed 
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throughout the country.  If the regime were backed into a corner it is not certain if they 
would use the weapons on their people.  There is also a fear that the conflict could turn 
into an ethnic one, and the international community will not look good supporting one 
side against the other, if a Libyan style intervention were authorized.    
 Unlike the Libyan opposition, the Syrian opposition is fractured.  There are 
multiple groups that would like to be the ultimate voice of authority once the Syrian 
regime is gone.  There is no one group that has the backing of the Syrian people that the 
United Nations or international community could back.  The main armed faction, the Free 
Syrian Army operates in Syria, but the leadership issues orders from refugee camps in 
Turkey.  Additionally, the opposition is largely Sunni which has the potential of creating 
conflict on ethnic grounds when fighting the Alawite/Shiite regime.  There are also 
elements of Islamic extremists in the Syrian opposition; in fact, one of the key armed 
groups has been designated by the United States as a foreign terrorist organization.  It 
will be hard to support an armed opposition that lacks unity of command.  With all this 
considered, providing an avenue for the opposition to defeat the Syrian government may 
hurt the people more than by allowing the events to play themselves out on the ground. 
Conclusion 
As the case study describes, the key difference between the situations in Libya 
and Syria is that the United Nations Security Council was able to pass a resolution 
authorizing armed intervention in Libya.  This gave the intervention legitimate authority 
as described by ICISS.  In Syria, Russia and China have successfully blocked any 
Western effort to implement a multilateral humanitarian intervention.  This alone will 
prevent a “legal” armed humanitarian intervention from ever taking place in Syria.  It 
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also underscores the continued selective nature of humanitarian intervention, despite the 
United Nation’s best efforts to make it otherwise.   
Arguably, the intervention in Libya can be blamed for the failure to meet both the 
right intention and legitimate authority criteria in Syria.  After NATO stretched the right 
intention criterion to its limits in Libya, it will not be able to convince the UNSC that 
regime change is not the NATO mission in Syria.  This is one of the primary reasons 
Russia and China will not allow a resolution to pass the council, which removes the 
possibility of legitimate authority.  It is also not in Russia’s best interest to allow 
intervention in Syria, as this would disrupt the status quo and endanger its access to the 
Middle East and Mediterranean Ocean.    
Another difference between the two conflicts is that the Libyan regime had a 
fractured military and limited external support which gave military intervention a 
reasonable prospect of success.  Also assisting the criterion of reasonable prospect is the 
fact that the Libyan opposition had an interim government ready to govern once Qadhafi 
was deposed.  In contrast, the Syrian regime has allies that are actively supporting it, and 
the opposition forces are ideologically fractured.  The uncertainty of the outcome of 
armed humanitarian intervention also limits the reasonable prospect criteria.  It is 
unknown how the Iranians, Hizballah, and even the Russians will react to an armed 
humanitarian intervention.  Intervention may cause more harm than good, creating the 
potential for a regional or global conflict.   Additionally, there is the “moral hazard” of 
intervention, the act of the rebellion/opposition to provoke the regime to commit 
atrocities to encourage the international community to intervene.  In this case, the 
promise of humanitarian intervention causes unintentional harm to the population of the 
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country in strife.132  If intervention occurs and succeeds in helping the rebels it 
encourages other rebellions elsewhere, creating a cycle of violence.    
In summary, the situation in Syria has continued to escalate for more than two 
years; there is the possibility that the al-Asad regime has used chemical weapons against 
the rebellion and civilians.133  If true, this would be a war crime and make it exceedingly 
difficult for the international community to stand by and not intervene.  Israel has already 
conducted unilateral air strikes on Syrian targets, challenging Israeli allies to justify the 
right intention for multilateral humanitarian intervention since the actions were not taken 
to protect the Syrian people.134  Action in Syria may have to be conducted under the 
auspices of preventive war instead of “Responsibility to Protect.”135  If intervention is to 
take place in Syria, it will likely be implemented unilaterally as it was in Kosovo. 
“Responsibility to Protect” is an idealistic concept that if wholly enacted would 
hold rogue states accountable for their actions and would likely prevent atrocities.  
However, as it stands, and as this chapter demonstrates, national interests will dictate 
whether or not intervention is implemented.  Failure of the UNSC to approve intervention 
in the case of proven genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, or crimes against humanity 
is a failure of R2P.  Accepting the ICISS proposed criteria for armed intervention as a 
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legal framework may be a step closer in holding the UNSC accountable to its 
















CHAPTER 3: Libya’s Civil Resistance Movements: From Arab Spring to 
Constitution 
Libya’s Arab Spring revolution originated the same way as Egypt and Tunisia’s 
uprisings, with countrywide nonviolent protests calling for regime change.  However, 
unlike Egypt and Tunisia, Libya’s revolution quickly turned violent and morphed into a 
six month bloody civil war that culminated in North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) intervention and the killing of Libya’s leader, Colonel Muammar al-Qadhafi.136  
Nonviolent resistance was present in all three country’s conflicts, with the difference 
being that nonviolent resistance alone was effective in the removal of the Tunisian and 
Egyptian leaders, while this was not the case in Libya.  This raises the question, what was 
the effectiveness of the Libyan civil resistance in the overthrow of Qadhafi and in the 
aftermath of conflict?   
Despite the fact that the armed rebellion received the most attention from the 
media, nonviolent resistance movements were active during the conflict.  This chapter 
argues that Libyan civil resistance movements were instrumental in the fall of the regime, 
particularly in attacking two elements of Qadhafi’s perceived sources of power, namely, 
control of the media/communications and the loyalty of the people within Libya’s capital, 
Tripoli.  The question posed above will be answered by identifying the strategies of 
effective civil resistance movements and analyzing their adaptation in Libyan nonviolent 
movements.  This chapter will examine the role, evolution, and success of civil resistance 
leading-up to and during Libya’s civil war, and conclude with an analysis of the 
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contributions of nonviolent movements in the transition of post-Qadhafi Libya to 
democracy (which is still ongoing).  
Nonviolent movements have a democratizing effect, primarily due to their 
requirement of mass mobilization and encouragement of participation.  This is important 
to the post-conflict role of Libyan civil resistance.  Qadhafi took power in 1969 during a 
military coup which deposed King Idris al-Sanussi.137  In order to solidify his 
dictatorship, he implemented Law 71 in 1972, which made illegal any political activity 
that was ideologically opposed to his movement. 138  An article of that law imposed the 
death penalty on anyone that “joined, formed, or supported any such [opposition] 
group.”139  Law 71 essentially outlawed dissention and the development of civil society.  
As a result, the Libyan people, had no understanding of what democracy was; they had 
not been allowed to choose their leaders in 42 years.  This has drastically changed in 
post-Qadhafi Libya, where nonviolent movements have taken the responsibility for 
keeping the spirit of the revolution alive; namely by representing the people’s grievances 
to the government, conducting training in the practice of democracy, and fighting 
corruption.     
First, however, it is important to define civil resistance and concepts and tactics in 
nonviolent movements that have been used from Gandhi to the Serbian student activists 
of Otpor! (Serbian for resistance).  This will provide a basis for the analysis of the Libyan 
civil resistance. 
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Civil resistance is a form of political action that relies on non-violent methods.140  
Throughout the chapter civil resistance will be used interchangeably with “nonviolent 
action” and “nonviolent movement.”  This should not be confused with nonviolence due 
to a philosophical pacifism.  While nonviolence or pacifism is generally thought of as 
“the refusal to bear arms on moral or religious grounds,” “‘nonviolent action’ is a 
technique of waging conflicts and is identified by the type of action employed.”141  The 
nonviolent nature of the conflict allows mass mobilization of the population and 
encourages participation.  In other words, civil resistance is a type of asymmetric warfare 
that enables the whole population to effectively participate in one form or another. 
 Much has been written on nonviolent strategy and how “people power” can be 
used to force changes in government policy, end military occupations, and even 
overthrow dictatorships.  Perhaps, the most comprehensive works are those written by 
nonviolent theorist/strategist Gene Sharp, who is often considered the “Godfather of 
nonviolent resistance.”142  Many consider Sharp’s three-volume The Politics of 
Nonviolent Action (1973) as the “theoretical foundation” for modern civil resistance.143  
Gene Sharp’s book, From Dictatorship to Democracy: A Conceptual Framework for 
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Liberation (first published in 1993), has been translated into numerous languages and is 
popular reading among aspiring and practicing revolutionaries throughout the world.  It 
was used as a training manual for Otpor! during the Serbian uprising and helped to 
educate the Egyptian revolutionaries during the Arab Spring. 
 The literature describes how to develop a nonviolent resistance from the ground 
up, but the theories do not go into detail on nonviolent resistance in the midst of a violent 
conflict as was the case in Libya.  This chapter will further the current literature by 
analyzing the effectiveness of nonviolent resistance during violent conflict and then its 
evolution.  I will use concepts developed and theorized by Gene Sharp and other 
strategists to analyze the effectiveness of the Libyan civil resistance while violent conflict 
was in full swing.  First, I will examine the concept of civil resistance, specifically in 
relationship to the overthrowing of a dictatorship. 
Nonviolent vs. Violent Resistance 
 As Gene Sharp explains, dictatorship comes down to the consent of the people to 
obey; once the people refuse to obey the authority of the regime, its legitimacy begins to 
crumble.144  It is important to begin our study by asking: why would a population choose 
nonviolent over violent resistance?  There are several reasons; for one, nonviolent 
resistance allows mass participation.  People from all walks of life can participate in civil 
resistance, whether it is by protest or by simply not going to work.  Nonviolent resistance 
also allows the participants to gain the sympathy of the international community, and 
potentially the government and security forces they are opposing.  The latter is 
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particularly vital when the regime has no qualms about using the security forces to 
suppress the nonviolent uprising. 
 In contrast, violent resistance only enforces the regime’s narrative that it is being 
opposed by terrorists or by a foreign backed insurrection.  It also legitimizes the use of 
the security forces in a violent crack-down.  The government holds the monopoly on the 
use of force and will have the advantage over any internal violent resistance.145  In other 
words, violent resistance may have the effect of reinforcing the loyalty of security forces, 
while civil resistance undermines it.  According to one of the authors of Why Civil 
Resistance Works, Erica Chenoweth, “when security forces refuse orders to…fire on 
peaceful protesters, regimes must accommodate the opposition or give up power…”146 
 Civil resistance has also shown to have a democratization effect; giving people a 
way to defend their newly won liberties and to keep elected leadership on notice.147  Erica 
Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan’s conducted exhaustive research to determine the 
overall success of civil resistance over violent resistance.  Besides finding that nonviolent 
movements did have more of a chance of victory than violent ones, they found that where 
civil resistance was successful there was also a better chance of democracy following the 
end of the conflict.148  This is largely due to the mass participation that civil resistance 
allows.  Gene Sharp also listed several reasons for the democratization effect of civil 
resistance: experience in civil resistance may make the people confident in pursuing it 
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again; civil resistance can be used to exercise free speech and free press in face of 
governmental repression; civil resistance contributes to the development of civil society; 
and civil resistance provides an avenue by which the people can counter repressive 
security forces.149 
 Civil resistance requires mass mobilization and organization, however, in the face 
of all- out war, it must remain covert and smaller in order to protect the participants.  
Small acts of defiance and civil disobedience are the best ways for a group to make their 
voices heard and to be able to escape without being discovered.  Tactics may include 
noncooperation, strikes, graffiti and other symbolic gestures.150  There are several 
methods that a nonviolent movement can select in order to confront an oppressive 
regime.151  As will be discussed in the case study, civil resistance during the Libyan 
conflict was a combination of civil resistance and active support to the armed rebellion.  
In these ways, civilians were able to participate in the armed conflict and the overthrow 
of Qadhafi without picking up a weapon. 
Strategy 
 As with any form of conflict, in order for nonviolent resistance to be successful 
there must be a coherent strategy.  A strategy will determine the time, place, method, and 
the reason for conducting nonviolent conflict.152  This section will examine several of the 
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key strategies and elements of nonviolent resistance that will later be used to analyze civil 
resistance in Libya.      
Unity, Strategic Planning, and Nonviolent Discipline: Activist scholars agree that there 
are three essential attributes to a successful nonviolent movement: unity, planning, and 
nonviolent discipline.153  The Center for Applied Nonviolent Action and Strategies 
(CANVAS)154 Guide to Effective Nonviolent Struggle breaks unity into three different 
categories: unity of people, the necessary participation of a diverse group of people to 
keep the movement legitimate; unity within the organization, having an appropriate 
leadership structure; and unity of purpose, the need for consensus in establishing goals.155  
Strategic planning is extremely important to keep the direction of the movement on 
course and to devise what tactics and methods to use and when to use them.   
The third attribute, nonviolent discipline is crucial to the success of civil 
resistance.  As mentioned previously, nonviolence promotes mass participation.  Most 
people will not join or do not have the skills to join an armed resistance.  As also noted, 
nonviolence de-legitimizes the opponent if he were to resort to violent repression and 
leads to the possibility of gaining the sympathy of the opponent’s supporters.156  Once a 
movement becomes violent it gives the regime the excuse it needs to use violence in 
return.  Lack of nonviolent discipline essentially undermines the legitimacy of the 
movement.      
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In many conflicts against dictatorships, such as in Libya, nonviolent discipline 
may be lost and violence unavoidable, however civil resistance is still possible.  Under 
these violent circumstances, Gene Sharp prescribes that nonviolent action must be 
separate from the violent action, whether by geography or issue.  If this is not done, then 
there is a risk that the violent action will overshadow the nonviolent action and sabotage 
its chance of success.157      
There are many elements of developing a strategy for a nonviolent movement and 
these elements will provide the best way to analyze the Libyan civil resistance during the 
conflict.  In Strategic Nonviolent Conflict, Peter Ackerman and Christopher Kruegler 
define twelve principles in three different categories in developing a strategy.  The 
categories are: Principles of Development, Principles of Engagement, and Principles of 
Conception.158  Here, I will focus on the Principles of Engagement.  The principles within 
this category are to attack the opponents’ strategy for consolidating control, mute the 
impact of the opponents’ violent weapons, alienate opponents from bases of support, and 
maintain nonviolent discipline.159  These concepts are further articulated for the activist 
by Gene Sharp and Robert Helvey in the discussion below. 
Sources of Power: Gene Sharp identified six sources of power that explain what a 
dictatorship such as Libya needs to maintain its rule.  They are: (1) authority, “belief 
among the people the regime is legitimate…;” (2) human resources, “number and 
importance of the persons and groups which are obeying…;” (3) skills and knowledge, 
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“needed by the regime to perform specific actions and supplied by the cooperating 
persons…;” (4) intangible factors, “psychological and ideological factors…;” (5) material 
resources, “rulers control or access to property, natural resources, financial 
resources,…means of communication and transportation;” and (6) sanctions, 
“punishments, threatened or applied,…to ensure submission and cooperation…”160  
These elements of power are dependent on the obedience of the people and if that 
obedience were withdrawn, as mentioned previously, the regime might begin to 
crumble.161  
Pillars of Support: There are also elements of support that the regime depends on to 
remain in power.  These elements are known as the “pillars of support.”162  The pillars are 
institutions and organizations, such as the police, military, civil servants, media, business 
community, youth, workers, religious organizations, and non-governmental 
organizations.163  While developing a strategic plan a nonviolent movement will study the 
regime’s pillars of support and develop tactics to undermine them.  Once a pillar is 
toppled the regime is also closer to falling.   
Methods: There are many nonviolent methods or tactics that have been developed to use 
against the regime.  Gene Sharp identified 198 methods of nonviolent action.  They are 
separated by category: nonviolent protest and persuasion, social noncooperation, 
economic noncooperation: boycotts, economic noncooperation: the strike, political 
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noncooperation, and nonviolent intervention.164  The methods are provided as ideas and 
the best method must be chosen for the situation; the idea is for the movement to remain 
creative and diverse in its tactics.   
Two major ideas of nonviolent action are to create a “dilemma action” for the 
opponent and to exploit the outcome of that action to create “backfire” that will put the 
opponent in a negative light.  Gene Sharp referred to this as “political jiu-jitsu” or, in 
other words, to use the opponent’s own actions against him.165  
Dilemma Action: A dilemma action is a proactive well planned act that “places the 
opponent in a situation where any response made will result in a negative outcome for the 
opponent.”166  In the case of Libya, Qadhafi was faced with countrywide protests.  He 
could either let them happen or try to repress them with the security forces.  Activist 
Philippe Duhamel best explains dilemma action in relation to the activist:  “…if the 
action is allowed to go forward, it accomplishes something worthwhile…If the power 
holders repress the action, they put themselves in a bad light, and the public is educated 
about the issue or position.”167  It is a win-win for the activist.  Qadhafi chose to use 
violent repression of the protests in order to avoid a situation similar to Egypt and 
Tunisia.  His choice “backfired,” which ultimately resulted in war, international 
intervention, and his death.  
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Backfire: Creating a backfire is the objective of the dilemma action.  In reference to 
“political jiu-jitsu,” Gene Sharp described it as:   
…the stark brutality of the regime against the clearly nonviolent actionists 
politically rebounds against the dictators’ position, causing dissention in their 
own ranks as well as fomenting support for the resisters among the general 
population, the regime’s usual supporters, and third parties.168 
 
Activist and scholar Brian Martin furthered the concept of backfire by developing a 
model to create it.  The model can be summed up in the two conditions for 
backfire, which are the perception that an action is “unjust, unfair, excessive or 
disproportional” and the action is made public with an emphasis on its injustice.169  
This brings about another argument that perhaps nonviolent movements are 
inherently violent due to the fact that they are trying to create a violent reaction 
from their opponent.170  Dilemma action and backfire are used by revolutionaries 
throughout the world to gain sympathy and delegitimize authoritarian and 
reactionary dictatorships. 
 Although these strategies seem to be focused on civil resistance as the sole 
form of conflict against a dictator, they can also be applied to the civil resistance 
movements that are active within a violent conflict against a dictator, as in Libya.  
In order for the nonviolent movements to be successful they must ensure that they 
remain separate from the violent groups.  They can be separated by location or 
issue.  Besides a long-term common goal, there should be no way for the regime to 
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connect the two.  If not separated, the nonviolent movement will be consumed by 
the violent one.  The nonviolent movement will need to maintain unity, nonviolent 
discipline, and have a sound strategy to conduct successful operations in an 
environment where the dictator is already committed to a violent war.  
Case Study 
 To judge the effectiveness of Libyan civil resistance in overthrowing 
Qadhafi, I will examine specific nonviolent movements that were active during the 
conflict and their ability to target the regime’s pillars of support.  I will specifically 
look at the concepts of dilemma action and backfire in relation to the named 
movements.  Finally, I will examine the democratizing effect that the Libyan civil 
resistance plays post-conflict as the country attempts to transition from a 
dictatorship. 
The role of Libyan civil resistance can be separated by events: Revolution 
(Day of Rage to the death of Qadhafi on 20 October 2011) and Post-Qadhafi.  As 
mentioned, I will look at both timeframes.  
Revolution  
Day of Rage:  I will begin our discussion with the Day or Rage protests which 
offer an excellent example of dilemma action and backfire.  The mass protests were 
organized in an attempt to replicate the results of the Tunisia and Egypt protests.  
The organizers chose February 17, 2011 as the day the protests would begin in 
Benghazi and several other eastern Libyan cities.  The date was chosen to 
commemorate the Prophet Muhammad cartoon protests that took place on the same 
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date in 2006, where security forces killed 11 protesters.171  However, the 2011 
protests started two days early, after Fathi Tarbel, one of the lead protest 
organizers, was arrested.172   
 The protests began in Benghazi on February 15, and by February 17 they had 
quickly spread to cities and villages throughout the country.  The Libyan government 
enacted Law 71 and began to violently crackdown on the protests.  The most inactive city 
was the capital, Tripoli, which was kept under strict control with mass arrests of activists, 
control of the internet, and small pro-regime demonstrations.173  The protests continued 
for several days before the opposition forces picked up weapons to fight the regime, 
eliminating the possibility of a completely nonviolent revolution. 
 There are several arguments on why the Day of Rage protests lost nonviolent 
discipline.  It might have been due to a lack of unity, strategic planning or their lack of 
clearly established and communicated end-state.174  Its early start was spontaneous, 
instead of as a desired well-coordinated mass mobilization of Libyan citizens.  Gene 
Sharp even proposed a theory that one of the high-level military defectors from the 
Qadhafi regime was an agent provocateur offering weapons to the rebels, which they 
accepted.175   
Whatever the reason for the failure of the Day of Rage protests, it did achieve 
several objectives that would prove beneficial to the opposition.  Perhaps most 
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importantly, the protests caused mass participation.  Despite the violent crackdowns, the 
protesters overwhelmed the security forces, pushing them out of many cities.  Benghazi, 
the origin of the revolution, became a safe-haven for the opposition where it was able to 
create an alternative government.  Additionally, many key Libyan government officials, 
military, and ambassadors abroad, resigned or defected in response to the violence used 
against the protesters.176  In other words, the actions of the regime backfired and resulted 
in domestic and international condemnation and led to the resulting civil-war and 
ultimately, the fall of the government.   
Pillar of Support - Control of the Media and Communication 
Before and during the conflict, the Libyan government controlled all forms of 
media and communication, from television to the internet.  Even if people had access to 
the internet, they seldom used it due to fear of being monitored and arrested if they were 
perceived to be anti-establishment.177  By exerting control over communication, Qadhafi 
was able to maintain the narrative that the protesters and rebels were “cockroaches,” 
while the majority of Libyans were loyal to the regime.178  The control of the 
narrative/message kept the disparate villages and cities separate, making it difficult to 
coordinate actions.  The control of communication was a key pillar of support.    
The government’s tight control also meant that the only news that the 
international community would hear about the uprising was controlled by the State.  
International journalists were not allowed to go to Benghazi, and in Tripoli, they were 
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kept in the Rixos Hotel, where they were given statements by the government.179  This 
made control of media and all communication extremely important and one of the pillars 
of support of Qadhafi’s power.  If this pillar fell, he would lose control of the narrative 
and his influence over the people. 
  Providing awareness of the situation to the international community became the 
primary role of the civil resistance.  The most active and organized movements came 
from the Libyan diaspora.  There were several groups, but arguably, the one that had the 
most impact was the Libyan Youth Movement or “Shabab Libya.” 
Libyan Youth Movement: The Libyan Youth Movement (LYM) formed in January 
2011 as a Facebook page and then a Twitter account on February 5.  Their goal was to 
“unite the Libyan youth both inside and out of Libya in preparation for the February 17 
[Day of Rage] uprising.”180 However, after the conflict began they became a source of 
accurate and reliable information for people and news agencies to hear what was 
happening on the ground.     
 The government was able to block the internet; however, it did so slowly, not 
shutting everything down at once.  The opposition secured internet access in the east 
(Benghazi); however, the west was quiet.181  LYM anticipated the media and 
communication blackout and set up a database of contacts in order to pass information 
from areas of activity in real time.182  LYM was administered by Libyan diaspora in 
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Canada and the United Kingdom, who used networks of friends and family in Libya to 
pass them situation reports.  The group would then post this information on their website 
or Tweet it to the media.  It was often the case that the LYM would act as a conduit 
between the journalists and the people on the ground witnessing actions.  They also 
would fact check international reporting to verify its accuracy.183 
 During the conflict, LYM was well organized and acted professionally, earning a 
reputation as a legitimate news source, from inside a country that was virtually blocked to 
the outside world.  In this role, it developed a set of journalistic guidelines for “breaking 
barriers and getting the news out.”184  These guidelines included: 
 Don't rely on news from other sources, get your own sources. 
 Verify the information twice even if it likely to be true. Gaddafi's son Khamis has 
died five times! 
 Use the phone and talk in person when you can. Rely on first-hand witnesses as 
much as possible. 
 Don't post news that is not confirmed by reliable sources. You might miss out on 
a scoop but you are maintaining your reputation. 
 Building a reputation takes time. Work hard, be patient and committed. 
 Get a good communication system in place for those working abroad. You will 
use your phone network and the Internet more than anything else; you'll need 
reliable service where you work. 
 Lots of people will disagree with what you say. Be open to criticism and accept 
differences of opinion. 
 Building a good reputation with international media organizations takes time and 
hard work; don’t give up and don’t expect to be on CNN the first week. 
 Back up your work. Expect cyber-attacks on your website; you may have to re-
upload materials online.185 
 
The success of LYM in raising awareness of the plight of the Libyan people broke 
Qadhafi’s control of the media and subsequently his control of the narrative.  LYM 
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provides an excellent example of how nonviolent civil resistance plays an effective part 
in a revolution and makes an impact internationally.  Their coverage of the violence 
committed against unarmed protesters and civilians may have created the backfire that 
led to the NATO intervention and the eventual collapse of the Qadhafi regime.   
The two conditions for creating a backfire in nonviolent conflict are present when an 
action is seen as excessive or disproportional vis-a-vis a nonviolent challenge and when 
that action becomes public knowledge.186  In the case of Libya, the excessive action was 
the regime’s use of excessive force on nonviolent protesters.  The LYM made that action 
public by alerting the international media and keeping the world informed. 
Pillar of Support - Control of Tripoli  
Control of the capital was key for Qadhafi and the regime’s survivability, as the 
final bastion of power.  If it appeared that he lost control of Tripoli, then it would 
significantly bolster the rebellion, and he would most likely face more defections and 
uprisings.  Thus, control of Tripoli became a second critical pillar of support for 
Qadhafi’s power.  Without a secure base from which to operate, Qadhafi’s rule was at an 
end.  If this pillar could be toppled, then the opposition would essentially have control of 
all of Libya’s population centers.   
 Qadhafi exercised control in Tripoli as the revolution and resistance grew by 
shutting down the internet, conducting mass arrests of suspected dissenters, deploying 
and paying civilians to act as informants, and demanding extra-judicial killings.187  
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Through his control of the media he attempted to have the rest of the country and world 
believe that Tripoli remained loyal to the government.  However, resistance movements 
were at work within the city.  Some were violent and employed guerilla tactics, while 
others continued to maintain nonviolent discipline.188  The most publicized nonviolent 
civil resistance group within Tripoli was the Free Generation Movement. 
Free Generation Movement: The Free Generation Movement (FGM) was founded by 
Nizar Mhani, a Libyan who had spent the last decade in Wales, but returned at the outset 
of the revolution.  He organized his family and friends to begin conducting “peaceful 
covert acts of defiance.”189  FGM’s goal was to keep morale up in Tripoli, to keep the 
spirit of the revolution alive, and most importantly, to demonstrate to the rest of the 
country and the international community that there was resistance ongoing within the 
capital.190 
 FGM conducted creative and diverse acts of civil disobedience that put them on 
Qadhafi’s most wanted list because of their effectiveness.  All FGM operations were 
filmed and uploaded to the internet and sent to the journalists who were “imprisoned” in 
the Rixos Hotel.  If they couldn’t get internet access the video was passed hand to hand.  
FGM organized a small demonstration inside Tripoli during early morning hours to avoid 
observation.  They painted the colors of the revolution on one of the main highways 
through the city, released pigeons with opposition flags tied to their legs, hung an 
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oversized opposition flag off of an overpass, and burnt a billboard with the picture of 
Qadhafi on it.191  FGM placed battery powered speakers in garbage bags, which they then 
placed around neighborhoods. At a set time, they played the old (pre-Qadhafi) national 
anthem in a loop.192  Probably one of the most meaningful tactics was the filming of the 
“Voices of Tripoli,” in which they filmed people at well-known places in Tripoli 
speaking out against the regime.193  These acts of civil disobedience had several effects.  
They lifted the morale of the increasingly concerned population of Tripoli, annoyed 
regime forces, and because they were filmed, they communicated to the rest of the 
country that resistance was alive in Tripoli. 
Mhani was able to broadcast FGM’s escapades on the internet and deliver them to 
the international media.  Although Qadhafi had shut-down the internet, one of Mhani’s 
family members was able to hack into the government intranet and used it to access a 
government satellite dish.  When these revolutionaries believed they were about to get 
caught, they posed as repairmen, removed the satellite dish and set it up at one of their 
safe houses.194  FGM was also very active on Twitter, keeping the media and 
international community aware of the situation in the capital.   
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FGM was extremely effective in countering Qadhafi’s narrative in Tripoli, 
threatening the second pillar.  The group understood the importance and potential that 
resistance had within the city and to the rest of the country.  The knowledge that there 
was an active resistance in Tripoli gave the opposition in the East hope that they would 
be able to take the city and overthrow the dictator.  FGM was instrumental in weakening 
Qadhafi’s perceived control of the Tripoli pillar of support. 
Post-Qadhafi Transition to Democracy 
After the fall of Qadhafi in October 2011, Libya had to essentially rebuild from 
the ground up.  Today, Libyan civil society, which was very limited under Qadhafi, is 
playing a large role in the transition to democracy and in post-civil war reconciliation.  
FGM and LYM are still active and key players in this transition.  There are also many 
other civil society organizations that are active in raising awareness of the plight of 
minorities, active in attempting to disband militias, and engaging the new government.195  
There have been several mixed nonviolent and violent campaigns since the fall of 
Qadhafi.  There have also been small pro-Qadhafi movements, federalism movements, 
and movements conducted by minorities.196  Although important to rebuilding the 
country and transitioning to democracy, the next few sections will examine nonviolent 
campaigns that revolved around reconciliation, government engagement, and the 
disbandment of militia.   
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Reconciliation: The Free Generation Movement’s website describes three phases of 
Libya’s progression: Resistance, Stabilization, and Development.197  The first phase, 
according to FGM, was civil disobedience as previously mentioned, the second phase 
discussed humanitarian assistance and the Mafqood Project.198  The Mafqood (missing) 
Project involves the collection of names of all the people that went missing during the 
conflict.  The hope is that this will help to bring closure to many of the families that lost 
loved ones.  In February 2013, the project received direct support from the United 
Kingdom and the International Commission for Missing Persons.199   
With the Mafqood Project, FGM is attempting to provide a service that the 
government currently does not have the capacity to fill.  They continue the struggle for 
freedom of the Libyan people by providing the truth of what happened to their loved 
ones.  FGM is also involved in several social awareness campaigns revolving around 
reconciliation, the 2012 elections, and anti-militias.  In the latter campaign, they were 
actively demonstrating against the presence of guns in the capital.  They distributed anti-
gun posters throughout the city and developed a public service announcement to raise 
awareness of the dangers of celebratory fire.200   
Government Engagement: The most prominent nonviolent movement to engage the 
interim government occurred in December 2011.  Youth groups, military, and women’s 
rights groups organized mass protests in Benghazi and in Tripoli, calling for transparency 
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in the National Transitional Council (NTC).  The protests included a tent city in Benghazi 
and accusations of the NTC “stealing the revolution.”201  The demands were for faster 
reforms and government transparency.  They also called for former Qadhafi officials to 
be excluded from the new government.202   The protests were effective in forcing the 
resignation of the Deputy Prime Minister and a promise of transparency from the interim 
Prime Minister.203 
With the fall of the regime, Libya has to draft a new constitution and elect new 
leaders.  Active nonviolent movements see this as the opportunity to participate in 
government and build a new Libya.  Multiple organizations were established in 2011 to 
train activists in democracy and electoral processes so they could in turn educate the 
Libyan population.   An example of this is that prior to the 2012 elections, FGM and 
three other groups received media training in order to produce public service 
announcements discussing voter education and participation in language that anyone 
could understand.204  The most active groups are youth and women; they perhaps have 
the most to gain with the new government.   
 Two groups that fit these criteria are the Libyan Women’s Platform for Peace 
(LWPP) and H20 Team.  LWPP seeks increased female participation in the Libyan 
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government.205  They initially objected to the Election Law, which stipulated a 10% 
quota for women representation in government.  LWPP conducted a month long 
campaign that was comprised of protests of various groups in the major cities and the 
drafting of an alternative law.  LWPP was successful and achieved a guaranteed 40 seats 
for women in the 200 member parliament.206   
  The H20 Team is a youth group aimed at acting as a conduit between the youth 
and the government.  Their efforts began with a campaign to increase constitutional 
awareness.  They travelled across Libya to over 60 towns, surveying youth on what they 
wanted to see in the national constitution. 207  Prior to the campaign, the team received 
training in constitution building, general rights and freedoms, the conducting of 
surveys.208  The surveys will be presented to parliament as suggestions and demands for 
new laws.   
 The groups mentioned above are developing networks across the disenfranchised 
populations of Libyan society and creating mass participation or at least mass interest in 
Libyan politics.  The social awareness that the groups are building will make it hard for 
the Libyan government to change course.  The Libyan example confirms Gene Sharp’s 
theory that “the source of a ruler’s power is the obedience and cooperation of the 
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subjects,” without which, the ruler would cease to be the ruler.209  If the Libyan 
government were to backtrack or not meet an important demand, they could very easily 
face more wide scale protests. 
Militia Disbandment: In response to the 11 September 2012 attack on the U.S. consulate 
in Benghazi, thousands of people took to the streets to protest the Ansar al-Sharia militia.  
The “Save Benghazi Rally” consisted of around 30,000 protesters calling for the 
government to criminalize militias and make revitalization of the national military and 
police a priority.210  The protesters stormed three militia headquarters including Ansar al-
Sharia’s, temporarily driving the militias out of the city.211 
The demonstration proved the people’s intent and capability of overcoming the 
militias. Activists achieved a government declaration to disband the militias.212  
However, the government is currently incapable of doing more than make threats, which 
militias are free to ignore.  On 15 November 2013, a massive protest against militias took 
place in Tripoli.213  The militia opened fire and killed 45 protesters creating a backfire 
that resulted in widespread protests and civil disobedience.214  The demands of the 
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protesters remain the same, for the militias to leave the cities and for the national security 
services to take control. 
 The anti-militia campaign employed several tactics and lasted from 15 – 30 
November.  In one protest, hundreds of women gathered to call for the militias to leave 
and collected signatures on a petition that stated the same demand.215  Tripoli’s local 
government called for a general strike until the militia left.  Lufthansa cancelled all 
flights going into Tripoli until the strike was called off.216  The campaign was effective in 
driving out several of the militias, and forced the government to deploy the military to 
implement security.217  Tripoli’s local government has given an ultimatum to the national 
government, to enact Law 27, which orders all militia to leave Tripoli by 31 December or 
they will resume the strike.218   
 At the same time, similar protests against Islamist militias took place in Benghazi 
and Derna.219  The city officials called for civil disobedience until the army was deployed 
and the militias had left the city.  The result was a general strike of the public and private 
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sector to include oil workers.220  The strikes have given leverage to the people to force 
the government to make good on their responsibility to protect the people.   
Caveats  
 There were several factors in the fall of Qadhafi, the most obvious being civil war 
and international intervention.  Civil resistance alone was not responsible, but, as I have 
argued, it did play a supporting role and without the parallel actions of the nonviolent 
movements the violent conflict would have been prolonged and fractured.  The violent 
opposition was active throughout the country, but they had little in coordination and 
communication.  The nonviolent movements discussed in the case studies were 
essentially enablers for the success of the violent movements.    
Conclusion 
 As this case study demonstrates, civil resistance movements during the Libyan 
conflict were effective in attacking two of Qadhafi’s pillars of support, which were 
instrumental in the fall of the regime.  They broke Qadhafi’s control of the media and 
publicized regime-committed atrocities creating a backfire effect that resulted in 
international intervention (albeit a violent one).  A nonviolent movement was key to 
shattering Qadhafi’s propaganda that Tripoli was loyal to the regime, it also made the rest 
of Libya aware that the capital was not complicit in the regime’s brutality.  These 
achievements were critical in the overall success of the revolution. 
 In the case of Libya, it could be argued that the armed struggle needed the civil 
struggle to succeed.  The fighting was conducted by disparate groups that were separated 
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geographically and Tripoli did not have any of the armed groups within its borders.  
Without the civil struggle the armed groups may not have had successful communication 
and coordination.  They would most definitely not have had a concentrated media wing 
that interacted with the international community.  The nonviolent movement was 
successful in changing the narrative of the conflict and without that the international 
community may not have been as receptive as it was.  Without question, the concurrent 
armed struggle hastened the fall of Qadhafi.  If the rebels had not picked up weapons and 
remained nonviolent, Qadhafi would have possibly fallen, but it would have been a 
prolonged and probably bloodier struggle. 
After the fall of Qadhafi, the nonviolent movements transitioned from a war-
footing to that of democracy building.  As Gene Sharp discussed in the democratizing 
effects of civil resistance, the people have gained self-confidence and experience in 
holding the government accountable for its actions.  They are filling roles that the 
government is incapable of filling and providing social services to the population.  In 
doing so, they are encouraging mass participation from Libya’s under represented 
populations.  This will create a public that is very aware of their rights and one that 
possesses a willingness to hold the government accountable.  
As explained in the literature review, the ideal nonviolent movement involves 
mass mobilization and remains widely nonviolent.  Civil resistance in Libya shows that it 
is possible to wage a nonviolent resistance in the midst of violent conflict, which is 
important for countries that are currently embroiled violent conflict, like Syria.  However, 
as discussed within the chapter the nonviolent movement must maintain nonviolent 
discipline and remain completely removed from the violent movement in order to keep a 
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sense of legitimacy.  The Libyan nonviolent movements did have their advantages that 
other struggling countries may not enjoy, they had a vast, well-connected exile 
community which enabled them to work overseas, which was beneficial for encouraging 
mass participation without the threat of retribution and, within Libya, the fighting was 
separated geographically with little communication between allied groups, which enabled 
the nonviolent movements to operate in a somewhat isolated fashion. 
It is true that the Libyan revolution was violent.  It did not peacefully overthrow 
Qadhafi, and violence is still a part of daily life.  However, nonviolent civil resistance did 
play an important part in the conflict and it is playing an even more important role in the 
transition of the government.  Libyans have realized “people power” and aren’t afraid to 
















 As of 2014, the Arab Spring revolution continues in one form or another.  In Syria 
there is ongoing conflict, with the victors becoming more and more uncertain.  In Libya 
the government is unable to establish rule of law, leaving a security vacuum that allows 
freedom of movement for terrorists and other nefarious actors.  The monarchies continue 
to make concessions to their populations to prevent mass unrest.  Arguably, the uprisings 
have inspired other oppressed and disenfranchised populations, leading to mass protests 
in China, Venezuela, and the Ukraine.   
 The effects of the Arab Spring will not be certain or fully evaluated for years to 
come.  However, what is certain is that the status quo has changed.  The international 
community has taken for granted that the regional authoritarian leadership would remain 
in control; maintaining stability and security.  However, the populace decided they 
wanted a change and forced their voice to be heard, changing the political dynamic of the 
region.  This has placed the United States in a challenging situation.  Who to 
support…the long-time authoritarian ally or the people who seek democracy?  
Unfortunately, the opposition groups seeking change do not have a well thought out plan 
to replace the authoritarian governments, leaving much uncertainty for the international 
community.  When considering vital national interests, in a tumultuous region, such as 
MENA, it is best to side with the “devil you know” than risk losing stability.   
 This paper has identified three concepts that could be evaluated at this early stage 
of the collective revolution: the relationship of the United States with the Middle Eastern 
monarchies, the status of “Responsibility to Protect” after the Libya intervention and lack 
of intervention in Syria, and civil resistance during violent conflict, as present in Libya.  
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Although not all-encompassing, these examinations can provide an initial understanding 
of the Arab Spring and how it has challenged these norms.   
 The relationship between the United States and the MENA countries whose 
leadership did not fall, the monarchies, was discerned by two factors: public opinion and 
a common perceived threat.  Public opinion is important because it now matters in a 
region where it has often been ignored.  This by itself can change a country’s relationship 
with another.  Particularly with an ally who was supporting the regime which was just 
overthrown.  However, the MENA monarchies have not been overthrown, possibly 
because they understood the need to listen to public opinion.  They will maintain control 
of their populations by granting concessions and allowing additional, albeit limited, 
freedoms.  Their security concerns and their determination to maintain power will keep 
their relationship with the United States, for the most part unchanged.   
 Similarly, the United States will continue to support the monarchies, despite their 
questionable human rights records, because of their strategic locations and generally anti-
Islamic extremist leanings.  The United States will continue to provide funding and 
security assistance to maintain basing rights and reliable allies in the Global War on 
Terrorism.  For the near-term, the support of the United States will enable the monarchies 
to quell any uprisings that were to take place.  As in the Bahrain case study demonstrates, 
the United States is not likely to back a “democracy” seeking population if it were to 
endanger its strategic interests. 
 Strategic interests also play a role in Responsibility to Protect.  The conflicts in 
Libya and Syria both started similarly.  However, in Libya the United Nations Security 
Council members had no strategic interests, making it easy for them to allow an armed 
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intervention.  In contrast, UNSC members (Russia) do have interests in Syria, causing 
them to object to an intervention.  Responsibility to protect was designed to give the 
international community the responsibility to stop/prevent genocide or other atrocities 
without bias.  In this regard, the concept of R2P essentially failed in relation to Syria.   
There are other factors that contributed to the authorization of intervention in 
Libya and not in Syria, including a reasonable prospect of success without causing more 
harm than good.  The Syrian regime enjoy external support from Iran.  If there were an 
international intervention, the likelihood of causing a much larger conflict would be high.  
Additionally, fault lies with the opposition.  It is fractured militarily, ideologically, and 
politically.  While Libya had an interim government in place to assume leadership after 
Qadhafi’s removal, Syrian rebels do not have a comprehensive plan for governance.  
However, if there were a reasonable prospect for success, it would be likely that the 
UNSC would continue to object due to overriding strategic interests. 
One of the more fascinating aspects of the Arab Spring was that, for the most part, 
it was the people, by pure force of will, which changed their governments.  Largely 
unarmed, they went face to face against armed security forces.  This wasn’t just mass 
protests as depicted on the evening news, this was a type of conflict that has been proven 
to undermine dictatorships across the world, and in the case of Egypt and Tunisia, their 
leadership was forced to step-down.  Revolutionary forces in those countries were able to 
depose their dictators nonviolently, unlike other countries in the region.   
Besides Syria, Libya was one of the more violent conflicts of the Arab Spring; 
however, it started nonviolently.  Although the violent aspect of the conflict made the 
headlines and was the impetus for international intervention, there were nonviolent 
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movements at work.  These nonviolent movements effectively played a supporting role to 
the armed opposition in ousting Qadhafi.  They provided a conduit to the international 
media in a country that was heavily censored and were instrumental in breaking the 
perception that there was a strong Qadhafi support base within the capital.  The Libyan 
civil resistance movements continued post-conflict to assist in reconciliation and 
democratizing efforts.  The state of Libya today is very uncertain, but because they have 
developed a strong and involved civil society, there is a better chance that they may 
evolve into a democratic society. 
The Arab Spring has changed the region, whether for the better is unknown at this 
time, but nonetheless the dynamic has been altered.  Further study and engagement is 
necessary to fully understand and take advantage of the new situation.  Without a good 
understanding of the populations’ needs and their struggles, it will be difficult for the 
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